SUBMISSIONS

COMMENTARY, ARTICLES, MISCELLANY, BOOK REVIEWS
The Journal welcomes manuscripts for consideration. Guidelines for submissions are as follows:

1. Footnotes: end of MS, as notes.
2. Avoid abbreviations.
3. Be consistent in ALL respects.
4. Polish entire MS very carefully.
5. Abstract for article: stress training, positions, publications. Third person.
6. Include color jpeg file photo of self.

Send Articles, Commentary, and Book Reviews via:
Email (preferred): intlcoll@bridgeport.edu
By post to: International College
126 Park Avenue, Bridgeport, CT 06604

© 2009 by the International College of the University of Bridgeport; 225 Myrtle Avenue; Bridgeport, CT 06604. All rights reserved. No part of this online publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The views expressed are solely those of individual authors.
Table of Contents

Foreword ...................................................................................................................... i

Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace: The New World Order of Critical Philosophy* ............. 4
*Claude Perrottet, Ph.D.*

Education for Sustainable Development and Human Security..................................... 34
*Jessada Salathong*

*Dr. Dave O. Benjamin*

China’s New Diplomacy Since the Mid-1990s
Rationale, reactions, and significance............................................................................ 57
*Dr. Zhiqun Zhu*

On Shame, Rage and the Middle Eastern Conflict......................................................... 73
*Dr. Richard L. Rubenstein*

Book Reviews

*Dr. Thomas J. Ward*
It is both with trepidation and a modest sense of accomplishment that we present this first edition of *The Journal of Global Development & Peace* for your consideration. This journal is meant to serve as a catalyst to expand research on the multifaceted themes related to peace and development. Recognition of the importance of this topic as well as the relationship between development and peace took on new relevance at the conclusion of the Cold War. Under the leadership of United Nations Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the first Post Cold War UN Secretary General, the world’s most respected international organization outlined its *Agenda for Peace* (1992) and its *Agenda for Development* (1994). In the *Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary General Ghali noted that “peace and development are interdependent.”

An appreciation for the resonance between peace and development clearly precedes the conclusion of the Cold War. In the Post World War II era, the United States and its allies felt compelled to devise and provide support for development strategies in Europe and in Asia that would allow key allies to become models of political and economic success and achievement. Countries such as Japan and Germany were to serve as exemplars and concrete alternatives to the Marxist-Leninist option that established hegemony in central and Eastern Europe and in much of Northeast Asia, shortly after the conclusion of the Second World War. Walt Rostow, who had served as an American intelligence officer during the Second World War, lectured on his formula to move from underdevelopment to development while at Cambridge in the late 1950s. This led to Rostow’s *Stages of Economic Development—A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960) that was one of the key texts to inform U.S-supported development programs during much of the Cold War period.

Vladimir Lenin, chief architect of the Soviet Union, elaborated on the tie between development and peace in the “Parasitism and the Decay of Capitalism” chapter of his *Imperialism—the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). Lenin cited Hobson who argued that an underclass (including the working class) could be lulled into indifference toward the exploitative nature of capitalism because imperialism made it possible to “enrich its ruling
class and to bribe its lower classes into acquiescence.”2 Neither Lenin nor Rostow appreciated the limitations of measuring progress through the prism of economic development. The tragic incidents of war, famine and genocide of this century and the century past remind us that finding a proper voice where the concerns of the world’s cultures, religions and ethnicities can be registered must factor more heavily in the development equation.

According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), human development can be resumed in a series of fundamentals:

- The most basic capabilities for human development are to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in the life of the community. 3

In a description of his guiding parameters for development, Mahbub ul Haq, the UNDP Human Development Report’s Founder outlined his concerns as follows:

- The basic purpose of development is to enlarge people's choices. In principle, these choices can be infinite and can change over time. People often value achievements that do not show up at all, or not immediately, in income or growth figures: greater access to knowledge, better nutrition and health services, more secure livelihoods, security against crime and physical violence, satisfying leisure hours, political and cultural freedoms and a sense of participation in community activities. The objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives.4

One of the key reasons for the controversies in the Post Cold War period stems from the jarring confrontations and conflicts that have resulted in recent years, sparked by certain constituencies feeling that they have not been heard.

Global Development and Peace are key themes that thus need to be studied in tandem with each other. On the side of development, we must address the challenges to development in countries such as Mali, Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso that seem to lack any immediate route to resolve their current state of deprivation, not just because of political oppression or because of warring factions but because of issues tied to geography and limited natural resources.

We must also address issues related to sustainable development, climate change and the
depletion of natural resources as we go forward. We must also must explore the extant approaches to peacemaking and examine the lessons learned from their application. What role will the United Nations play in future peace initiatives? What role will the United States play and what fate awaits the Reagan doctrine and the Bush doctrine? What role shall NGOs play in mediating and in preventing conflict? What role will China and India play in managing and mediating conflict?

These represent some of the matters that we hope to explore in upcoming issues of this journal. In this initial edition of the Journal of Global Development and Peace, we are pleased to include that span a wide range of topics including views on peace, sustainable development, diplomacy, human security, China’s changing diplomatic interests and divergent views on Islam and the Middle East.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all of the contributors to this first edition of Global Development and Peace: Dr. Zhiqun Zhu, Dr. Dave Benjamin, Dr. Claude Perrottet, Dr. Richard L. Rubenstein and Mr. Jessada Salathong, who are further introduced in the context of their Journal article.

I would like to thank all of those who have worked on this project with special appreciation to President Salonen for his support of this initiative, to Mr. Michael Bromley for his help in navigating the challenges of copyright law, to Ms. Arielle Caron for her work as Copy Editor and to Mr. Tomohiro Torikai for his efforts in the cover design and in the posting of the journal on the website.

I hope that our readers, including our own faculty and current students in International Political Economy & Diplomacy and World Religions programs and in our Graduate Program in Global Development and Peace, will enjoy the articles included here. We welcome feedback from our readers and look forward to posting representative responses in our letters section of the next edition of the Journal of Global Development and Peace that will appear in October 2009.

Thomas J. Ward
Executive Editor

Endnotes
Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*: The New World Order of Critical Philosophy

Claude Perrottet

Abstract

Kant’s 200-year-old essay is considered in light of its enduring impact on peace studies, the creation of the United Nations, and the implementation of a new world order based on lasting peace. Through a detailed analysis of its content and the cross-examination of various sources, it is suggested that the reputation of Perpetual Peace is not undeserved: while stressing the importance of fundamental principles applied to world affairs, it also provides realistic steps towards conflict resolution. Most importantly, the present study attempts to show how Kant’s view of religion’s role in human life, based on his critical philosophy, serves as the underlying catalyst of his apparently secular considerations.

One can legitimately wonder what a philosopher with an inclination for abstract theoretical thought could possibly contribute to the cause of world peace. Kant, in fact, uses that very point to ironically suggest that the ideas he proposes in *Perpetual Peace* are no threat to the powers that be—hence that they should be able to fly below the radar, so to speak, with no danger to the author. The rest of the document makes it however abundantly clear that Kant hoped for something else. Not unlike Confucius, he expected that the rulers of this world would have the wisdom to listen and much like his Chinese predecessor, he would certainly have had ample grounds for disappointment if he had lived in the decades that followed.

But it remains a fact that, more than 200 years after its first publication, Kant’s essay is routinely referred to as a work of prophetic insight, as a direct antecedent and inspiration to the founding of the League of Nations and later the United Nations. When one remembers that Kant hardly ever left his provincial hometown of Königsberg during his long life, “prophetic” takes on a new meaning: whatever valuable content is to be found in the essay is not based on worldly knowledge of international affairs or practical experience in that field. It is entirely based on Kant’s own reflections and directly related to the conclusions of his theoretical philosophy. In the Second Supplement of *Perpetual Peace* (“Secret Ar-

*Biography*

Dr. Claude Perrottet teaches philosophy and religion at the University of Bridgeport and works with the University’s Office of Distance Learning. Dr. Perrottet’s research focus has been Immanuel Kant and Paul Tillich. Laval University Press will publish his book on Kant in the Fall 2009. His book is entitled “Au-delà du critique kantien: la méthode critique-intuitive dans la première philosophie de la religion de Paul Tillich” (Beyond Kantian Criticism: the Critical-Intuitive Method in Paul Tillich’s First Philosophy of Religion), Presses de l’Université Laval, forthcoming (accepted for publication). He also recently published an article: “Tillich et le critique kantien: le lien insoupçonné” (Tillich and Kantian criticism: the unexpected link), in Laval Théologique et Philosophique, 2009, in press.
article for Perpetual Peace”) Kant actually suggests that rulers and princes should seek the advice of philosophers, who can thus be understood to be prophets of reason.4

1. Investigating Kant’s Perpetual Peace

If Perpetual Peace has been submitted to exegesis by students of Kant’s philosophy, as well as by political philosophers intent on assessing its real impact on the emergence of peace organization in the 20th century, the reverse is also true: there are those, like Jerry Pubantz, who have evaluated the United Nations by its ability or failure to live up to Kant’s vision. Similarly, Yale’s Bruce Russett repeatedly and in all seriousness speaks of Kantian vs. non-Kantian states in the context of UN peace building. It is, in fact, both mind-boggling and moving to see how contemporary political scientists submit present-day international organizations to precise scrutiny using Kant’s short essay almost as if it were an absolute paragon.

Not surprisingly, that has not always been the case. It is well known that, upon its publication, Kant’s essay was greeted with polite praise and considerable skepticism. Geismann sums it up somewhat emphatically, saying that “standing on the high shoulder of Hobbes and Rousseau, Kant, the professor of law, was able to look into a limitless land of liberty and peace. But as soon as that land’s features clearly appeared, they vanished again in the fog of 19th century worldviews.” Today’s renewed interest in Perpetual Peace thus represents a particular form of the famous “return to Kant” in the field of political philosophy.

The next question is about the meaningfulness of the present article. What, if anything, can a scholar of philosophy like myself who specializes in Kant’s most theoretical works possibly achieve by writing a journal article on a theme that requires knowledge in the political sciences – a knowledge I lack almost entirely? If I have nevertheless accepted the offer to do so, it is with the clear awareness that I will have to largely avoid the more political discussion of Kant’s contribution and concentrate on the directly philosophical content of his essay – to the extent that such an artificial partition is possible. After all, as I have noted above, it is that philosophical thinking that forms the entire basis for Kant’s contribution. Showing how and why it can have a valuable impact on the real world of contemporary world affairs is a meaningful undertaking.

2. The nature of Kant’s essay: afterthought, new beginning, or parallel development?

Perpetual Peace is known as one of Kant’s “semi-popular” writings, short pieces that are somewhat removed from the abstract, intricate rational deductions of his theoretical works, his critical philosophy. In writing these short essays, Kant uses a tone that is often reminiscent of Voltairean wit (minus the venom), but the intent is very serious.10

For all its significance as a precursor of contemporary political theory, Perpetual Peace is frequently considered an afterthought to Kant’s real contribution in
philosophy. In essence, that assessment may be correct, but it misses an important detail: though it was written in 1795 (less than ten years before Kant’s death in 1804), it is part of a series of similar writings, the first of which, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent was written in 1784, a mere three years after the first publication of the Critique of Pure Reason and years before that of most of Kant’s other major works. Key ideas of Perpetual Peace, including that of a League of Nations, already appear in the 1784 essay. The latter is thus part of an ongoing effort by Kant to relate his philosophical investigations to the practical concerns of society.

Perpetual Peace has antecedents not only in Kant’s own writings. It is well known that, in the 18th century and before, others had felt compelled to deal with this topic of both immediate and ultimate significance. There was the Abbé de Saint Pierre’s Project for Settling Perpetual Peace in Europe (Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe), (1713), Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Judgment on a Plan for Perpetual Peace (1761), a significant document given Kant’s considerable admiration for Rousseau, and Jeremy Bentham’s A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace (written between 1786 and 1789). None of these works, however, are much remembered today, even though the last two were penned by illustrious authors. Kant’s essay has two decisive advantages that give it lasting value. It is very specific rather than vaguely utopian and, as noted by A.C.F. Beales, it “lift[s] the discussion of war and peace far above the level of politics” and makes it a timeless question of ethics and conscience.

3. Significance of the title

The English title, Perpetual Peace, which is reminiscent of Jeremy Bentham’s work on the same topic, is a secularised translation of Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden, or Towards Eternal Peace. Perpetual and eternal practically mean the same thing, but the religious undertone of “eternal” is lost in translation. So is, of course, the ambiguity of the expression “eternal peace.” But Kant used that very ambiguity to initiate the discussion: the first sentence of the essay is an ironical reference to the fact that the only lasting peace available to humans might very well be that of death. As for the religious undertone, it need not be read into the text. Though discrete and thoroughly rational (as opposed to institutional), religion is present throughout the essay.

When Kant wrote his Perpetual Peace in 1795, the events of the French Revolution had been unfolding for several years. Two years earlier, in 1793, Kant had also written his most directly theological work, the often-maligned Religion within the limits of reason alone. This latter work has been attacked by Christians as godlessness dis-
guised in the form of rational religion, a monstrosity in their eyes. It has also been attacked by the “enlightened” like Goethe who saw in it proof that Kant had at last succumbed to the temptation of speaking in the traditional terms of “sin” and “redemption” to appease the Christian establishment. The fact is that in his Religion Kant uses religious (biblical) language in ways he does in none of his other major works, but he does so, expectably, without discarding the rationalist’s philosophical approach.

Recent scholarship has convincingly shown that this work was neither a departure from critical philosophy nor the final proof of its profane and agnostic nature. Common wisdom has it that, in his First Critique, Kant had demolished the very notion of a theoretical knowledge about ultimate things (including God). In his Second Critique, he insisted on the primacy of duty (the categorical imperative) regardless of consequences and rewards. Kant does consider the future outcome of our actions in his controversial moral proof for the existence of God and eternal life, but that interest is otherworldly. However, the Third Critique already hints at something different with its suggestion of a teleological explanation to this world’s existence and nature. In spite of his reputation as a pure deontologist Kant was, in fact, keenly interested in the outcome of our earthly actions.

The Religion represents a continuation of the Critique of Judgment and is intended to show the inevitable need for religion in addition to ethics. Kant repeats that moral action is self-sufficient and has no need for a purpose to exert itself. However, he adds, the notion of purpose cannot be dispensed with either, because “reason cannot possibly remain indifferent to the question of the outcome of our right action (Rechthandeln).” In spite of the otherworldly emphasis one would again expect to find in a work expressly dedicated to the theme of religion, Kant discusses that “outcome of our right action” in decidedly this-worldly terms. The third part of the Religion is entitled “The victory of the good principle over the evil principle and the establishment of God’s Kingdom on Earth.” In that section, Kant comes to the following conclusion: “Unnoticed by human eyes, the good principle is constantly at work … to establish a government and a kingdom representing a victory over the evil principle. Under its sovereignty, the world should be guaranteed eternal [perpetual] peace.”

It is perhaps time to quit (or at least interrupt) this digression on religion in an article about perpetual peace. And we can now afford to. The link between the Religion’s Kingdom of God and the secular equivalent of perpetual peace that served as the title of Kant’s essay barely one year later is now explicit. Though it may be of limited interest to the political scientist, the religious roots of Kant’s idea of a league of nations leading to perpetual peace is a fact and it could not be ignored, especially since Kant himself elaborates extensively on that linkage in the first Supplement (see below).

4. Structure of Perpetual Peace

The essay has three separate sections:
First, six preliminary articles indicating practices that should be avoided as soon as possible as a precondition for perpetual peace to be even thinkable; second, three definitive articles containing what Kant considered the key requirements for perpetual peace to be realized; and third, two supplements and an annex (or appendix) in two parts that contain some of Kant’s deepest thinking. If Kant’s structure here is predictably clear, it is also predictably complex as soon as one looks at it carefully, with arguments overlapping and the most important insight not always appearing where one would expect them to be.

As announced, I will leave it to others to dissect Kant’s document in every detail and from every possible perspective, something which in fact has already been abundantly done. This will hopefully give me the time and space to deal with some of what Rabelais would call the “substance-full marrow” of Kant’s underlying thought. Perpetual Peace is nevertheless short enough to allow for a brief point by point description of its main sections. The mere listing of some of the issues Kant brings up in the definitive and even the preliminary articles is evidence of the immense influence his vision has had on the quest for world peace up to date.

a) The preliminary articles

The preliminary articles perhaps show best that Kant did not ignore the empirical aspect of things and that he could be quite practical, even pragmatic when needed.

Kant stresses the importance of an immediate implementation of the first, fifth, and sixth preliminary articles over the other three. The first of these articles, Article 1, states that “No Treaty of Peace Shall Be Held Valid in Which There IsTacitly Reserved Matter for a Future War.” This immediately indicates the obvious, fundamental difference between peace treaties as they had been known and as they would be known in the future, treaties that are little more than armistices with a fancy name, and real lasting peace.

Kant introduces the Jesuit notion of “mental reservation.” Peace is then made as a matter of expediency when the continuation of war seems less desirable to both sides, each side secretly preparing for a new attack as soon as the occasion arises. There may be a difference compared to more recent times here, as nations and their democratic governments today often do have a genuine desire for peace after a protracted war, but are simply unable to maintain it, which would be the ultimate goal of peace-making. The autocratic rulers of Kant’s time can be assumed not even to have had that sincere desire in most cases but, after all, neither have many of the governments throughout the
20th century.

Articles 2 and especially 5 intend to prohibit any kind of intervention by one nation into the affairs of another under any pretext, including when such intervention may seem desirable. This requirement of non-interference, which many contemporary governments undoubtedly would welcome and others despise for a variety of reasons, stands in stark contrast to the just war doctrine. Practically, according to Kant, interference always leads to increased chaos. More fundamentally, it is against right. It means to “infringe on the rights of an independent people struggling with its internal disease; hence it would itself be an offense and would render the autonomy of all states insecure.” These two articles also vaguely allude to the problem of colonialism which, however, is further discussed in the third definitive article.

Most fundamental perhaps, and most influential is Article 6, “No State Shall, during War, Permit Such Acts of Hostility Which Would Make Mutual Confidence in the Subsequent Peace Impossible.” This article can be seen as a direct call for what would become the Geneva Conventions preceded by the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863. It directly exposes the contradiction inherent in war: war is an undertaking that requires those who participate in it to refrain from using the means most suitable for immediate success. Soldiers must be trained to kill the enemy, but they must be trained to do so in a humane way—something every decent government has been struggling with ever since. The reason is obvious. War is by definition not acceptable on ethical grounds and, as long as its possible end is not in sight, nations should at least include elements favorable to peace in the very conduct of belligerence. By and large, the generations following Kant, especially since the end of the 19th century, have agreed with that form of reasoning, even when they have not always applied it.

The remaining two articles (3 and 4) have a prophetic sound not so much because they announce the solution of a particular problem, but because they point out issues that have remained vexing and controversial to this day: the question of disarmament (“Standing Armies [miles perpetuus] Shall in Time Be Totally Abolished” – note the “in time”!) and that of national debt incurred for the funding of war (“National Debts Shall Not Be Contracted with a View to the External Friction of States”)

b) The definitive articles
The second section of Kant’s brief treatise, *Containing The Definitive Articles For Perpetual Peace Among States*, is where Kant exposes many of his key ideas on peace, though some of the most precious insights are actually to be found in the Supplements and Appendixes. Section II begins with the following statement:

The state of peace among men living side by side is not the natural state (*status naturalis*); the natural state is one of war. This does not always mean open hostilities, but at least an unceasing threat of war. A state of peace, therefore, must be established, for in order to be secured against hostility it is not sufficient that hostilities simply be not committed …

The Hobbesian notion of a natural state of war will be further analyzed in the discussion of the First Supplement. Following that brief but revealing introduction, Kant details the three main pillars of his suggested solution.

1) Republican vs. Democratic

By pitting the notions of republican and democratic against each other, the first definitive article appears to be an unexpected excursion into the realm of constitutional policy. For the American reader in particular, it also has a feeling of *déjà vu*, but in a definitely unfamiliar context.

Kant states that, for the sake of achieving perpetual peace, “the civil constitution of every nation should be republican.” He then makes it clear that republican does not mean democratic: democracy is a form of *sovereignty* in which the people, as opposed to a monarch or an aristocracy, possess power; republicanism is a form of government that is the opposite of despotism, one in which the executive is separate from the legislative. Each form of government can be either republican or despotic – except, surprise, the democratic one, which “is, properly speaking, necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which ‘all’ decide for or even against one who does not agree; that is, ‘all,’ who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom.”

The reasons for such a sharp distinction between the two notions are complex, not entirely clear to anyone, and somewhat removed from our interest. It has been said that Kant was referring to the democracy of Ancient Greece. But he was writing in 1795, just after the end of the reign of terror that followed the French Revolution and at the time when Napoleon was on his way to absolute power. It is easy to see how Kant could have come to the conclusions he reached about the despotic nature of democracy based on what he witnessed in France: a popular mob lynching former rulers, priests, everybody else, and each other.

The description quite fits what Kant otherwise says about the inevitably chaotic nature of democracy. But Kant was an ardent supporter, not a critic, of the French Revolution (he had also supported the American Revolution, which is consistent with his emphasis on the value of human freedom). More surprisingly, even after the French Revolution had turned into a generalized massacre, he
never withdrew his support and admiration, which earned him the epithet of *Jacobin*.

32 We thus have to leave it as what it is: an open question.

**Even if one discards Kant’s absolute pessimism about democracy, the observation remains valid:** the democratic form of sovereignty, as opposed to monarchy, is not necessarily more “democratic” in the modern sense (or more republican, to speak with Kant).

More interesting here is the distinction made between the form of government and the form of sovereignty, a difference that suggests that democracy is not inevitably, *per se* – democratic (the way we understand the term). Even if one discards Kant’s absolute pessimism about democracy, the observation remains valid: the democratic form of sovereignty, as opposed to monarchy, is not necessarily more “democratic” in the modern sense (or more republican, to speak with Kant).

The blooming of democratic republics in the second half of the 20th century would probably have comforted Kant in his view that democratic and republican, placed together, are a contradiction in terms.

Often it is however assumed that what Kant had in mind when referring to the republican form of government practically overlaps with what we call liberal democracy today. Quoting Fernando Tesón, 33 Patrick Capps makes the following comment:

Tesón considers that this [Kant’s view] corresponds to the modern conception of a constitutional democracy. He says: “By republican Kant means what we would call today a liberal democracy, that is, a form of political organization that provides for full respect for human rights” (p. 3). But minimally, what Kant means by republicanism is a government whose political power is restricted by a constitutional document which prevents despotism by either a monarch or the masses. 34

As for Pubantz, 35 he all but ignores the distinction and routinely refers to democracy as the form of government Kant had in mind. He also quotes former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who essentially has the same position as Tesón: “… Kant … argued that ‘republics’ – which meant essentially what today we call liberal or pluralistic democracies – were less likely than other forms of state to go to war with one another. Broadly speaking, the last 200 years have proven him right.” 36 Yet, ironically, this is the sole point on which Pubantz suggest an amendment should be made not to the UN system’s implementation of Kantian doctrine, but to Kant’s thesis itself. The suggested adaptation to reality is that international organizations might initially have to include members that are not
“free states” but have the potential of becoming so through a dialectical process involving Kant’s other two definitive articles.37

2) A federation of free states: dealing with the Münchhausen syndrome

Here, with the notion of a federation of free states,38 Kant appears most unambiguously as the forerunner of a new world order. His logic is rather simple. Since sovereign nations, by definition, have no judge above them to prevent them from acting aggressively towards one another, as is the case among individuals in civil society within each nation, such a superior authority has to be brought into existence. Given what Kant calls the obvious depravity of human nature, this seems more than unlikely to happen, as it would presuppose the very entity in need to be created in order to become feasible.

Kant has to deal (as we all do) with what I would like to call the Münchhausen syndrome.39 He has to show how man, so to speak, can get himself out of the water by pulling on his own hair, as the famous Baron is said to have done. The first step is to acknowledge that a superior entity with the function of a referee already exists, though invisibly and deprived of the means to enforce its rule:

The homage that every nation pays (at least in words) to the concept of right proves, nonetheless, that there is in man a still greater, though presently dormant, moral aptitude to master the evil principle in himself (a principle he cannot deny) and to hope that others will also overcome it. For otherwise the word right would never be uttered by those nations that want to make war…40

Kant then draws the logical conclusion:

… Reason, from its throne of supreme moral legislating authority, absolutely condemns war as a legal recourse and makes a state of peace a direct duty, even though peace cannot be established or secured except by a compact among nations. For these reasons there must be a league of a particular kind, which can be called a league of peace (foedus pacificum), and which would be distinguished from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis) by the fact that the latter terminates only one war, while the former seeks to make an end of all wars forever.41

League of peace (Friedensbund) immediately brings to mind the League of Nations. Such a league would not seek supranational power but only to maintain peace among its members through the idea of federalism. Ideally, once a “powerful and enlightened people” decides to form a republic, it should, by its power of attraction, gradually come to include every nation and thus lead to perpetual world peace42. But Kant is a realist. Such a loose federation of nations will not be able to enforce the ideal of peace. That would only be possible through a “nation of peoples…that (continually growing) will finally include all the people of the earth.” Since this is not to be expected and “if everything is not to be lost,” the “positive idea of a world republic” will, for now, have
to be replaced by the “negative surrogate of an enduring, ever expanding federation” that will, however, always be at the mercy of a change of mind. There is, thus, a back and forth between the idea of a well-intentioned, but limited League of Nations and the ultimate idea of a United Nations, or more precisely, of one Unified Nation. On Kant’s own premises so far, that second option has to remain a dream. But, unlike some of his predecessors, Kant was not a dreamer.

These implications are not a matter of philanthropy, but one of right.

3) Cosmopolitan right and universal hospitality: Kant and the “other UN”

The third and final definitive article deals with the necessary or desirable implications of the views expressed in the second. As Kant himself puts it, these implications are not a matter of philanthropy, but one of right. In accordance with the idea of a world federation of states comprising all of humankind, based on the common human dignity of every individual, Kant stresses the need for hospitality. At first, hospitality, if understood as the mere propensity to be kind and generous to strangers (a tendency some have more than others), this may appear to be a secondary point. But Kant sees the question in terms of people’s “right to visit, to associate [that] belongs to all men by virtue of their common ownership of the earth’s surface.” While Kant also acknowledges that the status of a permanent visitor (today’s permanent resident status) is not to be granted automatically, the emphasis in this section is clearly on the Western (European) world’s duty to behave properly towards the rest of the world – the great civilizations of the Far East, notably China (which Kant much admired) and the natives of less developed areas of the world.

This passage represents an unusually sharp indictment of European colonialism and particularly its justification by the need to expand markets. Kant names slavery by name and the words coming out of his mouth when discussing the Western military domination that inevitably accompanies commercial expansion include “most cruel” as well as “famine, rebellion, perfidy, and the whole litany of evils which afflicts humankind.”

The third article refers quite exactly to the role of what Pubantz has called the “other UN” that is embodied in organizations such as the UNHCR (High Commissioner for Refugees): “A ‘new’ United Nations, in some ways more reflective of Eleanor Roosevelt’s aspirations embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or Kant’s democratic alliance, than the role as world ‘policeman’ touted by Franklin Roosevelt in 1944 and 1945, has emerged in the new era.”

What is missing in Kant’s perspective is an acknowledgment of the constructive role of anything like our contemporary Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), the role of women in peace-making and the role of religious leaders in interreligious dialogue to resolve religion-based conflicts. The latter is easily explained by the poor opinion Kant had of the religious leaders and institutions of his time, the former by the fact that civil society, notably international civil society, did not have at its disposal the kind of intermediaries between sovereigns and the people that we now have in the form of NGOs and similar groups.

5. Quantum leap: the First Supplement

The structure of Kant’s vision for world peace has now been presented, but the temporary conclusion is about what should be, rather than about what will be and how it will come about. This additional step is tentatively, though not conclusively, made in the First Supplement. Kant had ended the main part of his document on a low note after removing the perspective of a world republic able to guarantee peace in all its constitutive parts, i.e., the whole world.

The Second Supplements is the only part of the essay that was added to the second edition published in 1796. Still, when reading the First Supplement, one already has the impression of a quantum leap, as if Kant had spent time reflecting on the unsatisfactory implications of his provisional conclusions, as well as on the internal logic of his entire system (the systematic quality of which would be threatened by inconsistencies in any of its elements). Here, Kant no longer speaks of conditions and preconditions for the achievement of peace but he tackles issues relating to the underlying rationale and justification of the whole enterprise. Quite naturally, it is for launching the idea of a league of nations and for introducing necessary factors in a compelling way that Perpetual Peace is mostly remembered – as well as dismembered by the analytical sharpness of commentators. Ultimately, however, it is perhaps the supplements and annexes (particularly the First Supplement) that offer the best material for an in-depth reflection on the subject. I believe that it is only by carefully examining the ideas found there that we can come to a full understanding of Kant’s vision.

I thus propose to have a closer look at the following questions: the notion, pervasive throughout Perpetual Peace and Kant’s other writings, that human nature is evil (the state of nature = a state of war); the notion that Nature, standing in for a divine Providence, uses the very inclinations that push people to make war to lead them to eventual peace; the nature of Kantian peace and its challenge by Hegel; and the possibility and desirability of going beyond a loose league of nations and achieve and integrated “world republic.”

a) The State of Nature

Throughout his essay and his other writings, Kant builds on the assumption that human nature is evil or “depraved,” an important departure from Rousseau. Commentators have largely assumed that Kant simply took over this pessimistic view from Hobbes and it is undeniable that Kant’s position immediately brings to
mind his British predecessor’s state of nature as a “war of all against all” (*bellum omnium contra omnes*, *Leviathan*, 1651). It is also true that Kant mentions Hobbes occasionally, but not necessarily in an approving way. In his 1793 *Theory and Practice*, Kant already takes up the touchy topic of the “coercive right” of rulers over their troublesome subjects (as he would in *Perpetual Peace*), but he describes Hobbes’ position as “terrifying.”47 If Kant rejects Hobbes’ suggested solution as unduly brutal, it is first of all because his understanding of the state of things is fundamentally different. What Kant says of fallen human nature in his *Religion* is essential to know if one is to understand how he believes that a decisive step can be taken toward a state of peace.

Kant clearly expresses his belief in human beings’ inherent propensity to do evil, while at the same time being aware of the categorical imperative to do what is right. In *Religion* and, to a lesser extent, even in the short writings like *Perpetual Peace*, Kant’s statements to that effect are very close to biblical verses (notably by Saint Paul); in fact, Kant often and surprisingly intersperses his text with biblical quotations – again, a rather unique occurrence in his body of work. Thus, Kant was very far from sharing the often superficial forms of 18th century optimism. In spite of his admiration for Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Kant did not share with him the belief that humans are born naturally good but perverted by so-called civilized society. Neither did he believe, with the majority of the *philosophes*, that progress was possible, even certain, at the hands of enlightened cultural pioneers. And he did share Voltaire’s rather pessimistic assessment of civilization as something remarkable that, nevertheless, gave little reason to believe in a radical improvement of the human condition.

In short, Kant believed that humans naturally tend to do evil (original sin), but that their conscience clearly tells them that the only rationally acceptable course of action is to do what is right – something they cannot do on their own because of the first premise. Hence, he writes in his *Religion*, it is rational to believe that there must be a Supreme Being that gives us the necessary support once we set out to do good and mean it seriously. Surprising as it may seem to those who know Kant from his critical philosophy (usually second-hand), his is thus a fundamentally Christian perspective expressed in the rationalistic language of the Enlightenment. The beliefs of Christianity are perceived in a purely formal and rational way that has become quite unfamiliar to the 21st century reader. The duty to do good is rational. It is the only behavior that makes sense. Doing evil is not just wrong, it is unreasonable, because I cannot rea-
man reason in questions of the relation of effects to their causes must remain within the limits of possible experience.\textsuperscript{49}

Kant’s reference to divine providence as a guarantor for eternal peace is barely noticed by commentators, which is not altogether surprising, since the literature on this essay essentially stems from the circles of political philosophers and political scientists who have little interest in theological speculation. Kant’s understandable choice to forego the use of religious language in the given context and speak of “nature” instead has not gone unnoticed, but it has been greeted by rather dismissive comments on the outdated nature of the metaphor. Parallels have been drawn to Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” (\textit{Wealth of Nations}, 1776), with the occasional remark that such a view of things distorts reality in an “almost grotesque way.”\textsuperscript{50}

Pojman offers a more matter of fact assessment: “This Aristotelian teleological thesis is problematic in a post-Darwinian world, unless one holds that a Providential hand guides the affairs of men and nations. Kant seems to have held this theist thesis, which may be the underlying basis for his optimism.”\textsuperscript{51}

In fact, Kant was literally fascinated by the notion of a purpose in nature corresponding to the purpose of human actions, a question that occupies him throughout his \textit{Critique of Judgment}. The beauty and purposefulness of nature’s arrangements leads Kant to reiterate the idea of a divine creator already present in the first two \textit{Critiques}. It is thus not surprising at all that he would, in \textit{Perpetual Peace},
Peace, extend this notion to a seemingly mysterious arrangement by which nature (understood here as the reality of things) would lead human affairs towards a pre-established purpose, using a complex web of opposing individual choices. Kant’s main practical argument is that the spirit of trade, “sooner or later gains the upper hand in every state,” is “incompatible with war,” and thus guarantees the goal of peace “adequately from a practical point of view” even thought a theoretical certainty remains elusive. Here, as we see, Kant replicates his classic distinction after the good.

Kant’s general moral vision, both in terms of personal ethics and in terms of international relations, is that what we are given as a moral duty must, by definition, be attainable. As always, his rationale is not based on the assumption that an always questionable goodwill will do the trick, but it does not exclude the presence of that goodwill, on the contrary. We thus have a three-tiered guarantee that lasting peace will be achieved. First, it does not depend on philanthropy but on reason. Second, since reason dictates moral behavior (I should not exempt myself from putting the whole community first, just because it is me), such behavior must be attainable. Third, since an obvious though mysterious deficiency prevents even the best among us from fully achieving that goal, we can and should expect help from God’s providence, to which Kant here more prosaically refers as the workings of nature. But it is not difficult to see that this three-tiered guarantee is nonetheless just a limited warranty.

For Kant, lasting peace does not depend on philanthropy but on reason. Kant’s real view of things is in fact somewhat different, but one must look carefully for it. It is most clearly expressed in a footnote:

In a morally practical point of view, however, which is directed exclusively to the supersensuous, the concept of the divine concursus is quite suitable and even necessary. We find this, for instance, in the belief that God will compensate for our own lack of justice, provided our intention was genuine; that He will do so by means that are inconceivable to us, and that therefore we should not relent in our endeavor
between theoretical certainty and practical assurance.\textsuperscript{56} The assumption that war is detrimental to trade is obviously not without merit, but the argument as stated by Kant is just as obviously open to criticism. I will defer to others, much more qualified than me, who have abundantly discussed this point.

\textbf{c) Hegel's challenge and the nature of peace}

Among the many challenges to Kant's position on war and peace, Hegel's comments in his \textit{Philosophy of Right} are perhaps best known. Hegel was not a warmonger and he too recognized the necessity of maintaining some degree of decency in the conduct of war though, as Mertens points out, one needs to refer to Kant's moral theory to find a proper justification for that position.\textsuperscript{57} But Hegel objected to Kant's absolute rejection of war, and he did so on several grounds. Among his objections, the most interesting one is somewhat unexpected, at least to the reader who is used to Kant's vision of things. War, for Hegel, has an ethical value, even though not without restrictions. It shows that nations have an identity and integrity that goes beyond the selfish interests of individuals.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, lasting (perpetual) peace would not be desirable, as it would leave people stuck in their small habits and self-centered ways, as opposed to the patriotism required by a war situation.

In the First Supplement, Kant also recognizes that an organic national unity is needed and that such national entity is willed by the people who will always reject the soulless abstraction of a world state. And Kant also recognizes that this automatically leads to wars and conflicts. But to him, this is an inevitable, though regrettable side effect – one that morality condemns and that nature helps overcome for the sake of the common good. National sovereignty is not ultimate. It is a building block.

As for the selflessness and heroism brought about by war alone, Kant mentions it too in \textit{Perpetual Peace} (again in the First Supplement), but his evaluation is totally negative: War, he says, is often considered noble, it is something “to which the love of glory impels men quite apart from any selfish urges.”\textsuperscript{59} Kant even adds that “some philosophers have praised it as an ennoblement of humanity” – but he concludes that this is forgetting that war produces more evil people than it eliminates.\textsuperscript{60}

Amazingly, however, in the \textit{Critique of Judgment}, one find a passage that sounds a lot more like Hegel than like Kant, something Hegel fails to notice:

Even war, when it is conducted with orderliness and holy respect for the rights of citizens, has something sublime about it. The way of thinking of the nation that conducts it in this way becomes more sublime as it gets exposed to greater dangers and faces them with courage. On the other hand, a long peace usually leads to the dominance of the spirit of trade that comes with petty selfishness, cowardice and self-indulgence and tends to lower the way of thinking of a people.\textsuperscript{61}
Mertens generously leaves open the question whether this passage is compatible with Kant’s writings on perpetual peace or not, but the contrast is in any case astounding. But Kant clarifies that for the warrior to receive the respect that fits the above description of war, he “also needs to display all the virtues of peace: gentleness, compassion, appropriate care for his own person. Only then will courage in front of danger prove that his soul is truly impossible to conquer.”  

All this is said from the perspective of aesthetic judgment, i.e., the subjective perception of the observer. In that context, Kant argues, the head of state, no matter how superior his position, will always have to give precedence to the commander of an army in terms of prestige.

This passage is important, because it shows an aspect of Kant’s view on peace that barely appears in Perpetual Peace, though it is present between the lines. It is present in Appendix I, where Kant expresses his considerable contempt for politicians. Kant contrasts the rare but respectable “moral politician” with the common “political moralist,” i.e., the one who acts according to political convenience and gives a post mortem moral justification to his despicable behavior. In other words, Kant does not deny that it is possible to show greatness in the conduct of war. What is utterly reprehensible is the conduct of war for political advantage. And Kant hints at the fact that the qualities most worthy of praise in human beings are more easily shown in the danger of war than in the convenience of peaceful trade. This contrast between Kant’s all-out advocacy of universal peace and his comments on warlike qualities opens a small window into the question of what and ideal, permanently peaceful human-kind would and should be like. It also confirms that the trick of nature in forcing peace upon men through the needs of trade can only be a temporary help until the sense of moral righteousness he so often stresses takes over in society. It also suggests that creating the conditions of perpetual peace might require a considerable amount of courage and selfless dedication.

**d) World republic or loose federation?**

By now, one is used to see Perpetual Peace as an early announcement of things to come – things that came to be in the form of the League of Nations and the United Nations. But was that really what Kant had in mind? If so, was he not disappointingly timid and, at the same time, unduly optimistic in the end? This question deserves close consideration, because it is really essential for an evaluation of Kant’s legacy. On the one hand, the United Nations as it exists today (not to mention the earlier League of Nations) has provided ample proof of its insufficiency, at times amounting to a near paralysis due to the absence of any coercive power. On the other hand, particularly in this nation, many have objected to any hint that even minimal powers be given to international institutions that could thus bypass US sovereignty and amount to a “dictatorship” by an antagonistic majority.

1) **Principle and reality**
In the second definitive article, as we have seen, Kant indicates that a world republic is literally required by reason as the sole possible solution. But Kant tacitly drops the idea because he recognizes that people will reject it and he seems to never take it up again. For this, he has been both praised and criticized by some of his most notable supporters. Whether right or wrong, however, Kant seems to have overruled the law of reason.

Heinrich Klemme cleverly notes that, if true, this would constitute an absolute anomaly.

To Klemme’s knowledge (and to mine), once Kant decides that something is willed by reason, he never gives up on it. The ironclad law of reason must be followed sooner or later – perhaps in some unknown, distant future – but it cannot be dismissed. Indeed, for Kant, the idea of an unfulfilled duty willed by reason will remain forever, even if the world ceased to exist. Reason will not rest until that goal is fulfilled. The particular instance of the world republic forms the one exception in the Kant corpus where the philosopher actually seems to accept as a fact that the ideal of reason will be frustrated, because people simply won’t accept it. This is in particular the exact opposite from what he says in “That May be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use (1793).” In the first Supplement, it is true, Kant explains that, after all, the existence of separate states is presupposed by the idea of international law, hence inevitable in spite of the limitation of a mere federation linking them, because the alternative would be the soulless despotism of one central world government – a despotism that would eventually turn into anarchy.

Klemme interprets this to mean that, after close consideration, Kant concluded that the idea of a world republic is thus not reasonable after all, which would explain why he abandons it.

It seems to me that this explanation is not entirely satisfactory. Kant never explicitly rejects his initial reasoning in favor of a world republic in Article 2, nor does he explain why he was mistaken in coming to such conclusion. He simply moves on after stating that the peoples of the world would never follow such a path and later gives a rationale for the preservation of independent national entities, as well as reasons to hope for eternal peace on other grounds.

2) Kant’s apparent inconsistency: a suggested answer

An excellent contribution by Pauline Kleingeld offers what I believe to be a decisive answer to the interrogations caused by Kant’s apparent inconsistency. Kleinfeld first notes that authors like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, for all the differences in their evaluation, simply assume that Kant came to reject the idea of a world government. She then proceeds to show that this is an erroneous premise. Kant does advocate a non-coercive league, but

Kant indicates that a world republic is literally required by reason as the sole possible solution.
this makes sense in the overall framework of his thought and, most importantly, it is compatible with his advocacy of a stronger “state of states.” As I had indicated above, Kant never repudiates his initial idea of a world republic or state of states, but he concludes that it will not be possible to make the jump from the state of nature to that universal entity. By advocating the intermediate step of a loose league, “Kant presents us with a view as to how to start leaving the international state of nature; he does not say that we should reject the idea of a world republic as such.”

Indeed, what Kant rejects in the First Supplement is a despotic, non-federal world government dominated by a superior power, not the idea of a supranational entity in itself. The really decisive observation here is about the workings of nature to separate nations through the divisions of language and religion. Kant clearly seems to suggest that, in this, nature works against a possible unity of the human race. But we need to look at the kind of unity that is thus to be averted: immediately after speaking of the dangers of a soulless despotism, Kant states that “nevertheless, every state, or its ruler, desires to establish lasting peace in this way [emphasis added], aspiring if possible to rule the whole world.” It is then that he adds “but nature wills otherwise” and goes on to speak of the differences in language and religion, a difference that does carry the potential for hatred and war, but also that for the development of culture through lively competition, source of greater harmony. It is thus the shortcut to a totalitarian world state that Kant rejects as dangerous and simply contrary to nature – not the idea of a unified humankind. A league of nations, freely joined by republican states, even if it lacks coercive powers, leads into the right direction. At the very least, it serves as a platform for peaceful debate. Ultimately, through “endless approximation,” the goal of a peaceful world should be attained.

3) A hint from the Religion within the limits of reason alone

At this point, I believe it is essential to return to Kant’s Religion, a work in which I had initially shown Kant’s vision of perpetual peace is rooted to a large extent. In the preface to the second edition, one finds a statement that seems to be at odds with the title, Religion within the limits of reason alone. Kant compares revealed religion and pure rational religion to two concentric circles, revealed (and institutional) religion being the outer circle encompassing and protecting the inner circle of pure, rational and ethical religion. Religious traditions, with their revealed truths and their practices, no matter imperfect in Kant’s eyes, are the necessary ground in which pure, rational faith can grow. Human beings are not capable of making the shortcut to pure religion that “proceeds from mere a priori principles, as if experience did not exist.” They need to gradually discover the real significance of religious revelation and teachings and then to eliminate the “crust” that has become unnecessary. Religious life stems from existing traditions, not from an abstract rational faith. Throughout the Religion, Kant makes this point and he also states that the tradition serving as a starting point
can be any religion, even though he naturally considers the case of his own Christian tradition. Kant spends much time showing how the core essence of Christianity is compatible with the pure rational and ethical faith of his philosophy.

**Religious life stems from existing traditions, not from an abstract rational faith.**

The reciprocal (some would say dialectical) relationship between pure religion and traditional religion appears clearly in the First Supplement. In the text, Kant states that nature employs differences in religion and language to prevent people from mixing, that this involves “a tendency to mutual hatred and pretexts for war,” but that finally the progress of civilization leads to “greater harmony” and finally “peaceful agreement.” On the other hand, in a footnote, Kant makes the corollary perfectly clear:

Difference of religion – a singular expression! It is precisely as if one spoke of different moralities. There may very well be different kinds of historical faiths attached to different means employed in the promotion of religion … but such differences do not exist in religion, there being only one religion valid for all men and in all ages. These can, therefore, be nothing else than accidental vehicles of religion, thus changing with times and places.74

Kant doesn’t hide his distaste for the church leadership he knew and its collusion with the powers of the state75 – he was at odds with both at the time – and some of the typical 18th century anticlericalism can be found in *Perpetual Peace* and other similar essays. But that criticism comes second to the fundamental acknowledgment that pure rational religion needs a home base in a particular tradition to realize itself.

The same is true for languages76, hence cultures and national traditions, which is our main concern. Just as there can be only one religion in Kant’s eyes, there is only one humankind, all differences in national sovereignty being mere “accidental vehicles … changing with times and places.” But these accidental vehicles are the only possible building blocks of genuine human unity. National sovereignty is in no way a holy cow for Kant as it is for some other thinkers. But it is a starting point to be acknowledged, and only a gradual, willing movement towards greater unity will make world peace possible. Therefore, Kant’s entire account of the workings of nature can be read as an indication of how a worldwide federation (details unspecified) can be aimed at without forceful centralization and at the same time without remaining on the level of a well intentioned by powerless association.

4) Contemporary views: towards a federation

As both Kelingeld and Klemme indicate, Jürgen Habermas (whose sympathy for Kant is well known) has recently moved towards advocating such a midway solu-
tion. To describe his vision, Habermas uses a terminological monstrosity of the type German scholars take delight in – but this one makes sense. He speaks of a “world domestic policy without a world government” (Weltninnenpolitik ohne Wel트regierung). As Kleingeld puts it:

Habermas suggests that a dynamic array of deliberative democratic processes and organizations, at the national, international, and transnational levels, can greatly increase the level and legitimacy of binding regulation concerning matters of global concern. Thus, it is possible to continue the transformation of international law into a cosmopolitan order (a process that Habermas recognizes is already underway) without leading to a centralized world government.

Pollock notes that, in its present state, the United Nations, with its minimal sovereignty and capacity to enforce its edicts, already represents a step beyond the mere “negative surrogate” of which Kant speaks. Pollock admits that it is questionable whether the UN lives up to Kant’s expectations and its own criteria, but it at least begins to fulfill the double requirement stressed by Kant. Member states maintain their identity and full sovereignty in internal matters, but they do sacrifice some amount of autonomy in settling international disputes. This takes into account the principle of subsidiarity that is the basis for the political system of the Swiss Confederacy and the United States of America, whose founding Kant enthusiastically welcomed, precisely because it was a freely willed coming together of a commonwealth of equal states deciding how much of their sovereignty they were willing to give up for the sake of the common enterprise.

6. Kant’s timeless ideal and the road to its implementation

In a recent public lecture on the Middle-East crisis, Richard Rubenstein repeated his conviction that the perspectives for peace in that region of the world are slim to none at this time, whatever the changes in the political leadership. The gist of his argument was a reference to Hegel’s reading of Antigone as representing the tragic collision between incompatible ethical paradigms. The problem, then, would not be that one side is right and the other wrong, but that both sides have exclusive claims to being right that annihilate each other. In this case, conflict or war seems inevitable because of the very ethical values of the protagonists.

How would Kant respond? Undoubtedly, he would point to his own distinction between religion and specific historical faiths. As he acknowledges in Perpetual Peace, the existence of different historical faiths is both necessary (as no pure rational religion will ever appear out of the blue) and more than likely to lead to severe clashes. The way out of the conundrum is for both sides to eventually recognize that the real value of their faith does not lie in the specifics of their tradition, but in their own ability to practice a genuine ethical religion based on these traditions. Kant even agrees with believers of the faiths involved that supernatural help is (or may be) needed to reach
that result, but he would deny that this help can be obtained by any other means than the sincere and total commitment to achieve the highest good. In particular, he would consider any claim to a divinely ordained right over a holy place or holy land absurd. Kant’s position on this would in turn have very little chance to be listened to by more than a small minority on either side. But Kant has time: he does not claim that the developments leading to perpetual peace will be completed soon or even in the foreseeable future, but that it has to be sooner or later, because it is the absolute requirement of reason.

Again using religious language, Kant concludes that “if we assume that humanity never will or can be improved, the only thing which a theodicy seems unable to justify is creation itself, the fact that a race of such corrupt beings ever was on earth.” And he gives further clarification to what was said above about human greatness in war and peace:

If seeing a virtuous man struggling with tribulations and temptations towards evil and yet holding his own against them is a sight fit for a divinity, so is it a most unfit sight for even the commonest but well intentioned man, not to mention a divinity, to see the human race advancing from period to period towards virtue and then soon afterwards to see it again falling as deeply back into vice and misery as it was before. Observing this tragedy for a while may perhaps be moving and instructive, but the curtain must finally fall.

The practical question is then whether there is a faster and more efficient way to reach a solution than the somewhat timeless perspective that Kant espouses. Paradoxically, if we stand today on the foundation of the United Nations system – no matter how insufficient and imperfect – it is, I believe, because we reap the benefits of 200 years of dialectical conflicts, just (or supposedly) just wars, and a whole array of elements for which Kant had very little sense. The very un-Kantian 19th and 20th centuries perhaps give us the best chance ever to approach Kant’s timeless ideal.

Kant does not claim that the developments leading to perpetual peace will be completed soon or even in the foreseeable future, but that it has to be sooner or later, because it is the absolute requirement of reason.

Kant’s vision of a new world order is thus both idealistic and realistic, neither utopian nor unduly down to earth. That is the genius of his vision and the obvious reason why it not only survived to be remembered, but served as an inspiration for real life realizations in the world of 20th century politics. Beyond what has already been said, I will not even attempt to show where it falls short, as my purpose here was to present its rich content.
with as much clarity as possible, not to take sides in a debate that is going on in academia and on the world stage at this very moment. I believe that, among other contributions, Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* and related writings raise the question of the proper balance between central authority and autonomy, indifference and interference, integration and pluralism, all from the perspective that harmony and peaceful cooperation are always the final aim.
References:


2. Kant was writing under the reign of Prussia’s Friedrich Wilhelm III. Unlike his predecessor, Friedrich (Frederick) the Great, this monarch was not practicing enlightened despotism. Kant was forced to commit himself to refrain from publishing works of a religious nature. Writing on political matters was thus risky, which should never be forgotten when reading the contents. For a very detailed analysis of the subtle way in which Kant uses language to sidestep censorship and at the same time sending clear, even provocative messages in *Perpetual Peace*, see: John Namjun Kim, “Kant’s Secret Article: Irony, Performativity, and History in *Zum Ewigen Frieden*.” Germanic Review, Summer 2007, Vol. 82 Issue 3, pp. 203-226.

3. It should nevertheless be added that Kant was in direct contact with the great minds of his time, that he was in constant dialogue with them, and received news of international events. In a way, he can thus be compared to a contemporary student of world affairs who has no direct access to sources other than the Internet.

4. It is to be noted that Kant absolutely rejects Plato’s idea of the philosopher-king. See *Perpetual Peace*, p. 34.

5. A recent example is a collection of essays by German and English-speaking social scientists published on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the first publication of *Perpetual Peace*, coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II: James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), *Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal* (The MIT Press, 1997).


9. I will also refrain from repeating too many details on the historical circumstances surrounding the publication of Perpetual Peace, the relationship between that work and other works by the same author, as well as the debate between Kant and his contemporaries. This research is in itself fascinating, but the information can easily be found by the interested reader and it is not really germane to the purpose of my article.

10. See Kim, Ibid.,


13. Published posthumously as part of The Principles of International Law. Though Bentham’s life and work as a whole chronologically follow rather than precede Kant’s, this particular work was thus written a few years prior to Kant’s Perpetual Peace.


referred to as Religion.


23. It is to be remembered that, at the time when Kant drafted his *Perpetual Peace*, his own country, Prussia, and Austria had unsuccessfully attempted just such an intervention against revolutionary France (Kant was an ardent supporter of the French and American revolutions). As Kim explains, Prussia was also involved in the second partition (i.e., dismemberment) of Poland at that time. *Ibid.*, pp. 211-213.


30. *Ibid*.

31. See Andrew J. Yu, “Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* and contemporary peacekeeping” *Peacekeeping & International Relations*, 11873485, Mar/Apr98, Vol. 27, Issue 2. This view is supported by the fact that in preliminary notes for *Perpetual Peace*, Kant indicates that the Ancient Greek did not know a “representative system.” *Akademie-Ausgabe* XXIII, “Vorarbeiten Zum Ewigen Frieden,” p. 167.

32. *Perpetual Peace*, p. vii, Lewis White Beck’s Introduction. Kant himself strongly rejects that accusation of
“support for mob action” … in a country more than hundred miles removed.” Kant also acknowledges that the French Revolution may succeed or fail and that it “may be filled with misery and atrocities to the point where a sensible man … would never resolve to make the experiment at such cost [a second time]. Nevertheless, he also sees the potential for spectators (which would include himself) to feel “a wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm.” This sympathy, which he deems potentially dangerous, “has no other cause than a moral predisposition in the human race” to seek for rights and a morally good constitution. The overall vision, for Kant, remained thus more important than the flaws in its execution. See Immanuel Kant, “An Old Question raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?” (1798) In: On History (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 144-145.


35. See Note 3 above.


37. Pubantz, p. 17.

38. Kant literally speaks of a “federalism (Föderalism) of free states”. Perpetual Peace, p. 16.

39. No relationship to the psychiatric condition known under the same name, in reference to the same semi-historical figure, but with the typical Anglo-Saxon economy of one “h”.


42. Perhaps an indirect reference to the newborn French Republic, this statement can also be applied to the contemporary notion of American exceptionalism and the role the United States would play in the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations. Kant’s words here at the very
least put into perspective the opposite opinion expressed, for instance, by Herfri Münkler in “Kant's ‘perpetual peace’: utopia or political guide?” Open Democracy (May 26, 2004), available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-iraqwarphilosophy/article_1921.jsp (retrieved on November 23, 2008).

Münkler contrasts Dante’s “imperial” peace plan (based on the strengthening of a dominant power) with Kant’s “republican” plan, adding that “Kant’s federation of states does not account for a superpower like the United States; unquestionably a political realist, Kant would have realized that such an overwhelmingly superior power could not be fitted into his projected structure.” By equating imperial with despotic, Münkler’s analysis does not take into account Kant’s distinction between the form of sovereignty and the form of government discussed above.

43. Perpetual Peace, p. 20.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., pp. 22-23 (slightly revised translation).

46. Pubantz, p. 17.


50. Klemme, ibid., p. 15.


52. Even in Perpetual Peace, in the midst of his argumentation for nature’s arrangement guaranteeing peace among humans, Kant digresses into considerations on the miraculous arrangements of nature permitting humans to exist in the first place. For instance: “But the care of nature excites the greatest wonder when we see how she brings wood (though the inhabitants do not know whence it comes) to these barren climates, without which they would have neither canoes, weapons, nor huts …” Ibid, p. 27.

seau’s reversal: Rousseau believed that civilization, far from improving man, destroyed his natural goodness. Kant again reverses this assertion by showing that the passions and vices of culture may be real, but that, in the long run, they open the road to peace.

54. After acknowledging that it may appear that only a “nation of angels” could constitute a peaceful republic, Kant famously states: “The problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, can be solved even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent. The problem is: ‘Given a multitude of rational beings requiring universal laws for their preservation, but each of whom is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, to establish a constitution in such a way that, although their private intentions conflict, they check each other, with the result that their public conduct is the same as if they had no such intentions.’” Perpetual Peace, p. 30. And in Appendix I: “Moral evil has the intrinsic property of being opposed to and destructive of its own purposes (especially in the relationships between evil men); thus it gives place to the moral principle of the good, though only through a slow progress.” Ibid., p. 45 [Slightly modified translation].


56. Ibid., p. 32.

57. Thomas Mertens, “Hegel's Homage to Kant's Perpetual Peace: An Analy-


58. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 324, Note. The German original is available at: http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Hegel,+Georg+Wilhelm+Friedrich/Grundlinien+der+Philosophie+des+Rechts; the English translation can be found at: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/work/pr/ (December 8, 2008).

59. Perpetual Peace, p. 29.

60. Ibid. Kant was not referring to Hegel, whose Philosophy of Right was published in 1821.


62. Ibid., p. 262.

63. Ibid., p. 37 ff.


65. Perpetual Peace (Beck translation), p. 31
66. A detailed analysis of Kant’s works over time (culminating with the Metaphysics of Morals, published in 1797, two years after Perpetual Peace) is said to reveal a steady shift away from the idea of a world republic. See Fisch, ibid., p. 144.


70. Kleingeld, p. 305.

71. Ibid., p. 307. Kleingeld goes on to indicate several instances in Perpetual Peace and even in the Metaphysics of Morals (the later work where Kant is supposed to have moved further away from the idea of a world state) where it becomes clear that, for Kant, the league of nations was merely a provisional goal on the way to a real “state of peoples” (Völkerstaat). For references, see Kleingeld, p. 307.


74. Perpetual Peace, p. 31.

75. Kant suggests that, at the end of a war, the state organize a day of atonement or fasting in addition to the thanksgiving for victory. Ibid., p 20, Note 8. What begins as a simple suggestion to add a call for forgiveness to the expression of gratitude ends in a biting comment expressing Kant’s real feelings: “The thanksgiving for victory won during the war, the hymns which are sung to the God of Hosts … stand in equally sharp contrast to the moral idea of the Father of Men. For they not only show a sad enough indifference to the way in which nations seek their rights, but in addition express a joy in having annihilated a multitude of men or their happiness.”

76. It would be interesting to have Kant’s opinion on an artificial universal language like Esperanto. It is safe to guess that he would have seen its lack of real success as a confirmation of his theory.


78. Konstantin Pollock, ibid.

80. Perpetual Peace, p. 46.

Education for Sustainable Development and Human Security

Jessada Salathong

Abstract

Over the past decade, the concepts of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) and human security have emerged in international development and developmental studies. This paper aims to study the two concepts comparatively. Both concepts cover a lot of common ground, including the idea of sustainable development that is now increasingly seen as an important agenda. However, they are still new and often abstract. Many times, they bring about confusion and difficulties in implementation. Although an exploration of the conceptual interdependence of ESD and human security has a great potential, such research has rarely been undertaken. This comparative study might suggest the interrelation between ESD and human security as well as some choices and challenges in order to achieve the concepts both as destinations and means of a more sustainable future.

Education for Sustainable Development and Human Security

Abstract

Over the past decade, the concepts of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) and human security have emerged in international development and developmental studies. This paper aims to study the two concepts comparatively. Both concepts cover a lot of common ground, including the idea of sustainable development that is now increasingly seen as an important agenda. However, they are still new and often abstract. Many times, they bring about confusion and difficulties in implementation. Although an exploration of the conceptual interdependence of ESD and human security has a great potential, such research has rarely been undertaken. This comparative study might suggest the interrelation between ESD and human security as well as some choices and challenges in order to achieve the concepts both as destinations and means of a more sustainable future.

Education for Sustainable Development and Human Security

Jessada Salathong

Abstract

Over the past decade, the concepts of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) and human security have emerged in international development and developmental studies. This paper aims to study the two concepts comparatively. Both concepts cover a lot of common ground, including the idea of sustainable development that is now increasingly seen as an important agenda. However, they are still new and often abstract. Many times, they bring about confusion and difficulties in implementation. Although an exploration of the conceptual interdependence of ESD and human security has a great potential, such research has rarely been undertaken. This comparative study might suggest the interrelation between ESD and human security as well as some choices and challenges in order to achieve the concepts both as destinations and means of a more sustainable future.
Over the past decade, the concepts of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) and human security have emerged in international development and developmental studies. Although the formation and the development of these two concepts seem to be slightly different, they cover a lot of common ground.

Today, ESD becomes a concept and terminology that is being promoted and driven by different institutional platforms especially organizations under UN umbrella including UNESCO and UNEP. It is being increasingly recognized through the influence of Agenda 21 and the more recent World Summit on Sustainable Development at Johannesburg (2002). The Summit broadened the vision of sustainable development and reaffirmed the educational objectives of the Millennium Development Goals and the Education for All. Following the Plan for Implementation of the Johannesburg Summit, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 57/254 on the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, 2005-2014, and designed UNESCO as lead agency for the promotion of the Decade (JBIC, 2004). Since then, the concept of ESD has been gaining momentum as one of vital platforms to achieve the goal of sustainable development.

During this same decade, the concept of human security has been around within the international system as well. The concept debuted in 1994 when UNDP issued the Human Development Report and identified human security for the first time by marking the distinction between “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” (UNDP, 1994). Since then the concept has been adopted by a number of states and international organizations. Between 2001 and 2003, Canada and Japan provided the leadership and funding to support the concept of human security on global agenda. Since then, it has become a topic of reform agendas in the UN and regional organization, such as the European Union (Tadjbukhash, 2005).

Despite all the interest and support from several groups, governments and international bodies, ESD and human security, however, have not been adopted and mainstreamed. To maximize the benefit of the concepts and ensure that they will bring a better and more sustainable future to all of us, the interconnection between ESD and human security should be addressed.

Although an exploration of the concep-
Education that enables people to foresee, face up to and solve the problems that threaten life on our planet

ESD: what is it really?

It is impossible to move to a further discussion or debate without first defining ESD. However, defining ESD itself can bring about a huge debate. It can be said that to answer “what is ESD?” can be the first point of contention.

Although ESD has been increasingly recognized as an emerging field of education especially since the Decade of ESD was initiated, the precise definition of ESD is still vague and abstract. Many meanings of ESD have been proffered, but there is no single universal one. Moreover, its concept differs under different agencies. Even in Resolution 57/254 on the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, there was no reference that can be referred as a definition of ESD (UN, 2002). The least ambiguous definition of ESD is probably found in UNESCO’s Promotion of Global Partnership for the UN Decade of ESD: The International Implementation Scheme for the Decade in brief (UNESCO, 2006).

Still, rather than a single solid definition, the booklet offered three definitions. The first one is “Education that enables people to foresee, face up to and solve the problems that threaten life on our planet”. The second definition stated that ESD also means “education that disseminates the values and principles that are the basis of sustainable development (intergenerational equity, gender parity, social tolerance, poverty reduction, environmental protection and restoration, natural resource conservation, and just and peaceful societies)”. However, the meaning that seems to be the easiest to understand is the last one, “education that highlights the complexity and interdependence of three spheres, the environment, society— broadly defined to include culture—and the econ-
Figure 1. Concept of human security

Figure 2. Concept of ESD

Comparing the key concepts in Figure 1 and 2, they overlap and link in many points as we can see in Table 1. Health and environmental issues are obviously overlapping. However, other components are also closely intertwined. Economic security can be boosted by transformation and engagement of leaders. Biodiversity and climate change greatly affect food security. Personal security relate to engagement of leaders, information and awareness, as well as many issues in cross-cutting issues and themes, including human rights and gender equity. Intercul-
tural understanding and community empowerment can be considered as a key component to community security. Human rights, governance and peace issues also closely link with political security. According to the report entitled Our Common Future that was launched by the World Commission on Environment and Development or the Brundtland Committee in 1987, sustainable development is widely accepted as “development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (p. 54). In this regard, sustainable development concept also reflects human security since it is ensuring “freedom from want” of present and future generations (Good Governance for Social Development and Environment Institution, 2003, p.247). Meanwhile, as a large number of global security issues, such as terrorism, climate change and natural disasters, including the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, have highlighted the fragility and sensitivity of human security, ESD can be also a vital tool to ensure “freedom from fear”.

Table 1. Core ESD issues with examples and human security key components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core ESD issues</th>
<th>Example of the issues</th>
<th>Related human security components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information and Awareness</td>
<td>Eco-media, media literacy, ICT</td>
<td>Economic and personal Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Systems</td>
<td>Learning for local and indigenous knowledge, integrating traditional and modern technologies</td>
<td>Community Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Protection and Management</td>
<td>Biodiversity, climate change, natural resources, conservation</td>
<td>Food and Environmental Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Equity</td>
<td>Conflict resolution, peace, equity, appropriate development, democracy</td>
<td>Community and political Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Context</td>
<td>Community Development, empowerment</td>
<td>Community Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>Rural transformation, urbanization, sustainable habitat, water, sanitation public infrastructure</td>
<td>Economic and Health Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Diversity and intercultural/interfaith understanding</td>
<td>Community Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Cutting Issues and Themes</td>
<td>Human rights, citizenship, gender equality, sustainable future, holistic approaches, innovation, partnerships, sustainable production and consumption, governance</td>
<td>Environmental, Personal and Political Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS, malaria</td>
<td>Health Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Education Engagement of Leaders</td>
<td>Integrated pest management, environmental awareness, community recycling programs</td>
<td>Environmental Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional training courses, executive education, partnerships, networking</td>
<td>Economic and personal security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The data from column 1 and 2 are from Promotion of global partnership for the UN decade of ESD: The international implementation scheme for the decade in brief (p.2), by UNESCO Bangkok, 2005.
In *Human Development Report 1994*, UNDP revealed that “the real threats to human security in the next century will arise more from the actions of millions of people than from aggression by a few nations” (p.32). The report also identified many forms of threats in the next century including environmental degradation and international terrorism (UNDP, 1994, p.32). To prevent the threat of human security and ensure global sustainable future, only to achieve the universal basic education might not be enough. ESD should be integrated to ensure that individuals are empowered to contribute to global human security and sustainable development.

*Choices and challenges*

Although ESD and human security are the concepts that emerged within the same period and are both being propelled by states and various organizations especially UN agencies, surprisingly, ESD documents almost never mentioned about human security and vice versa. As the two concepts share several components in similar, they should be linked or integrated to support each other. ESD can be employed as a tool to ensure human security. At the same time, human security can be viewed as one of ESD’s goals. However, the vagueness in the definition and concept of ESD and human security seems to be a handicap. There is no single universal definition for both concepts. This may be a big burden given that definitions do count when consensus is sought for cooperation.

An examination of the root of ESD’s definitional problem requires the examination of the definition of sustainable development. Although the most recognized definition of “sustainable development” seems to be the one that was defined in *Our Common Future*, it is still difficult to understand. It can be interpreted and recreated differently, which can lead to confusion and contradiction. Fien & Tilbury (2002) even consider sustainable development as a concept that “imprecisely defined, ambiguous, socially and culturally contested, and therefore subject to both a wide range of interpretations” (as cited in Stevenson, 2006, p.278).

As a result of difficulties in defining “sustainable development” and the lack of a single universal meaning, it is difficult to place sustainable development as the center of any conceptualization. When the hollow concept of sustainable development is placed at the core of ESD, unsurprisingly, there is the same hollowness in the concept of ESD as well.

Although human security might not need to directly deal with the terminological
-ambiguity of “sustainable development” like ESD since it does not put the term as its core, the lexicological vagueness is still unavoidable. At the present, UNDP’s 1994 definition of human security remains to be the most widely cited and

**The gap between North and South as well as their varied political agendas might be a barrier.**

“most authoritative” (Cockell, 2000). However, Paris (2001) acknowledged that the conceptualization of human security is still “sweeping and open ended” (p.91). He also argued that different organizations and states also defined human security differently— even the leading states in this area like Japan and Canada (Paris, 2001, p.90-91). However, even if UNDP’s definition and conceptualization of human security is adopted to mitigate the present terminological problem, it still contains other conceptual confusions. King and Murray (2001-2002) suggested that although the seven components of human security “imply a number of potential interrelated and overlapping dimensions centered on human dignity, but do not provide a coherent framework for integrating them into a single concept” (p.591). This scenario can be considered as a problem for ESD as well.

Besides the definitional and conceptual ambiguity, another problem that ESD and human security share is the confusion of paradigm shift. Since they are both emerging concepts, people tend to confuse them with more conventional concepts. As there is a massive confusion between ESD and environmental education, there is also the same problems distinguishing between human security and national or state security. It is very important to work out carefully the relationships between the traditional concepts and the newcomers.

If all this vagueness and confusion are clarified, will ESD and human security be mainstreamed? The answer might not be as easy as it seems. Originally, both concepts were introduced and propelled by the developed world. In this regard, the gap between North and South as well as their varied political agendas might be a barrier. For example, although employing ESD as a tool to achieve human security is promising, it would be impossible if the goal of universal primary education remained still unachieved. For human security, Tadjbakhsh (2005, p.2) mentioned that the countries like China and India might not support the concept due to the fear that human security might introduce new conditionalities or excuses for unwarranted intervention and violation on state sovereignty. Therefore, making sure that all states and parties are in agreement and ready to propel ESD and human security mechanism is another big challenge that is needed to be taken into account.

**Conclusion**

To summarize, through this comparative study, the author found that besides being an emerging concept, ESD and human
security share some common ground, including conceptual similarities and problems. For the conceptual similarities, multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary are the common characteristics shared by the two concepts. Comparing the key components, ESD and human security relate in many points. Health and environmental issues are obviously overlapping. However, other components, economic, food, personal, community and political security, are also closely intertwined. Moreover, sustainable development can also ensure “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”.

For choices and challenges, the author found that ESD and human security share following three pointes. The first one is terminological and conceptual vagueness. The second point is confusion of paradigm shift. And the last one is the problem on international consensus and disparity to promote both concepts. The study reaffirms that ESD and human security are interdependent. The two concepts should be linked and promoted together. To prevent the threat of human security and ensure global sustainable future, only to achieve the universal basic education might not enough. ESD should be integrated to empower individuals to contribute to global human security and sustainable development. In the future, how ESD and human security can be integrated and supported each other and how to overcome the marked challenges and problem should be studied.
References


Dave Benjamin

Abstract

The post-Cold War era has seen transformation in the concept of sovereignty and collective security. The start of the twenty-first century has seen great emphasis being placed on human security and a responsibility to protect. Governments have a responsibility to their peoples to ensure improvement in the material conditions for all, while the international community has a responsibility to protect the vulnerable when the state either cannot or will not protect them. Consequently, Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect have presented challenges to authoritarian regimes to be accountable to the international community if they won’t be responsible to and for their own peoples. The international community has, meanwhile, reserved a right to intervene based on a Responsibility to Protect, enshrined in the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the World Summit Outcome in 2005. Human Security has, in a sense, become the imperative intended to prevent intervention in the sovereign state.

Biography

Dr. Dave Benjamin holds a Ph.D. and M.Phil. from the University of Cambridge, UK. He was previously on the faculty of St. George’s University where he was instrumental in setting up the Liberal Studies programme at the School of Arts and Sciences. He has held a Visiting Professorship at the Political Science Department of University of Connecticut.

Dr. Benjamin is the author of a number of articles on governance and international politics, including the crisis in Kosovo in 1999, the resurgence of the extreme Right in Europe, implications of mass terrorism for the Caribbean Community, and the Reagan-Thatcher “Special Relationship”. His research interests include governance and vulnerability in small island developing states, the North-South divide, and policy toward the Eastern Caribbean.
Introduction

The end of the Cold War prompted an awareness in the international community that the Fukuyama vision of global prosperity and liberal democracy was not going to be realized in current conditions. The world had been fractured, divided between the wealthy powerful states and the poor weak quasi-states in an international system dominated by competition for strategically valuable resources and markets. Many of the world’s producers of raw material, especially those in Africa, had been reduced to proxies of both superpowers, whether fighting civil wars, or hosting three decade old dictatorships, or as bastions of underdevelopment and poverty. The international economic architecture, designed by the elite in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury, sought to foist the fiscal, monetary, and trade standards of the North on the South with a view to designing a new international economic architecture that more accurately reflected their priorities.

In the mean time, civil wars and wars of secession were erupting in volatile regions. Conflict broke out in the Balkans the leaders of Serbia and Croatia sought to carve mini-empires in the former Yugoslavia. A coup was attempted in Papua New Guinea over access to diamond mines, while a succession of incursions in the Comoros ensured continued access to diamonds by mercenaries supported tacitly if not obviously by France to the detriment of the indigenous population. Civil wars continued in Angola and Mozambique, while Apartheid was on its last legs in South Africa. Somalia collapsed into civil war with warlords competing for political power and control over resources. From Sierra Leone to Equatorial Guinea and Liberia, civil wars broke out with valuable minerals being used as currency to acquire arms for the military/political effort.

In all these cases, the civilian population existed at the mercy of warlords and their agents, untrained or ill-trained militias bearing arms, demonstrating a level of violence against the innocent and vulnerable that was hitherto unimaginable, and wreaking carnage wherever they marauded. Rwanda erupted in 1994 in a scale and pace of genocide unrivalled by preceding events, even the genocide in Cambodia in the 1970s and 1980s, with 800,000 innocent Tutsi civilians and moderate Hutu being slaughtered in 100 days. Through these episodes the United Nations generally looked on. The Security
Council adopted resolutions but there was a manifest absence of political will to act, to intervene or sponsor intervention, to embargo warlords, to fulfill the Charter of the United Nations – to prevent future wars and protect the innocent. Sovereignty was debated with continued reliance on the Westphalia model and the Montevideo Convention 1933, seemingly oblivious to the harsh reality that inaction among the Permanent Members of the Security Council ensured the continued slaughter of civilians who had been dehumanized by their tormentors. Rwanda made a powerful statement about the full extent of inaction by the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council and the Office of the Secretary-General. Years later, words of contrition were expressed by some who had the power to do something but failed to act pleading ignorance or an inability to transform senior bureaucratic office into some meaningful attempt to save the lives of those who were the subject of genocide. The United Nations was in danger of making itself irrelevant to the realities of the time and consigning itself to the status of a dinosaur – mere fossil.

The Charter

Lost in the mechanics of Security Council and General Assembly decision-making is the reality that the Charter of the United Nations was written in the names of the Peoples of the world. A sort of Constitution, the Charter placed on states the onus of representing and protecting the populations that were citizens. It also made the organization responsible for protecting the innocent of the world with the mission to protect and promote international peace and security, and prevent future wars. Chapter VII in particular, gave the Security Council special responsibility to declare any event a threat to international security by declaring it a threat to the collective security of the membership of the United Nations. The Security Council was duty-bound to take action in event of the emergence of a threat to international peace and security. Although ambiguous in the detail, the broad implication of the Charter and of Chapter VII in particular, was to prevent inter-state conflict.

The new reality of secessionist and civil wars posed a challenge to the United Nations and to the Security Council in particular. Legally the United Nations could not intervene in conflict within the state because of the legal language and implications of Article 2(4) and 2(7) of the Charter. Although Article 2 forbade interference in the internal affairs of the state, and article 51 recognized the right of the state to self-defence, reliance on 2(4)(7) to justify non-intervention has long been suspect. The United Nations has, in long been suspect. The United Nations has, in fact, intervened or authorized intervention in sovereign states under the guise of humanitarian intervention. This was the substance of ‘Uniting for Peace’ (1950), which saw the General Assembly adopting a resolution mandating the Security Council to take action in Korea where the Security Council had reached a stalemate. ‘Uniting for Peace’ was invoked in 1960 to justify intervention in Congo, although this time the mission was far more ideologically and strategically motivated with
the United States and the old European colonial powers wanting to overthrow Patrice Lumumba in Congo. ‘Uniting for Peace’ afforded the Security Council a legal instrument with which it could intervene in Congo, overthrow and execute Lumumba, and replace him with Captain Joseph Mobuto who has gone down in history as one of the most corrupt dictators of the Cold War era (Hancock 1989; De Witte 2001; Wrong 2001).

There has long been a fundamental flaw in the Charter of the United Nations. On the one hand it is written in the names of the Peoples of the world and recognizes states as guarantors of the security of their peoples. In a sense, the Charter assumes universal application of liberal democratic principles in which the branches of government function with a common mission to protect the rights and liberties of the individual against abuse by other individuals, non-state entities, or the state. The Charter assumes institutions of governance that guarantee that the most basic rights, freedoms, and liberties of the sovereign people, and recognition by the state of its fundamental responsibility to assure protection of such rights and liberties. Conversely, the Charter assumes that the state will not flagrantly violate the rights, freedoms and liberties of the sovereign people, especially the vulnerable. In a sense, the Charter is therefore a utopian construct of advocates of liberal democracy and liberal values who assumed that the Charter could protect the innocent by entrusting that responsibility to their states.

The Charter overlooked one essential fact of twentieth century history. The Holocaust was perpetrated by agents of the state, utilizing the apparatus of the state, against the most vulnerable in society – people who had been dehumanized and demonized because of their ethnicities, or medical conditions. Eugenics was transformed from mere pseudo-scientific construct to state policy authorizing the apparatus of the state to actively and aggressively pursue genocide and other crimes against humanity. Whereas the people of another state – Poland – could be viewed as sub-humans who could be civilized, minorities in Germany were classified as subjects who could not be, and so were condemned to death with the intent to destroy their populations in whole (Fein, 1993: 61-67). With awareness of what the state can do to its own population, the architects of the United Nations and authors of the Charter chose to ignore the harsh reality that even the highly civilized Europeans were guilty of having used the apparatus and institutions of the state against their own people during the twentieth century and were willing to entrust to the uncontrolled state the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations.
which was always a recipe for disaster. The veto guaranteed the Permanent Members of the Security Council the power to reject draft resolutions simply because of their power. An arbitrary provision, the veto in theory was a safeguard to ensure consensus decision-making. However, the veto was the principal obstacle to decision-making in Korea in 1950, Biafra in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, and Apartheid South Africa in the 1960s through the 1980s. The negative power of the veto was again evident in July 2008 when the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China together prevented the Security Council from authorizing the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the President of Sudan for trial by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity including genocide, and war crimes.

Beyond the veto has always been political will. The clear absence of political will was the single obstacle to United Nations Security Council action in Rwanda in 1994. Political will was absent in Korea and Biafra, as it was in the early 1990s when the government of Nigeria engaged in the massacre of Ogoni people. Political will was manifestly absent during the killing fields in Cambodia in the 1970s. It was absent during appeals from the developing world for comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Apartheid South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. The combination of the veto and the absence of political will was the catalyst for the adoption of ‘Uniting for Peace’ in 1950.

In real terms then, the Charter addresses a very different set of issues from the modern reality. The Charter is designed to lay a foundation for collective action by all member states of the organization against any member state(s) that opts for the use of force against any other state(s).

The Charter sees the actual or potential use of force by one state against another as the central cause of international insecurity, and does not address conflict within the state. The Charter is therefore, an anachronism when faced with the reality of contemporary conflict in the international system.

**Human Insecurity**

The post-Cold War era has seen an explosion in intra-state conflict. The absence of reference to intra-state conflict in the Charter is indicative of two considerations:

that the founders of the United Nations did not foresee systematic state fracture and civil wars; and that there was a near obsession with protecting the legal standard of sovereignty as agreed at Westphalia and enshrined in the Montevideo Convention 1933. Although sovereignty has been abridged by United Nations interventions in internal affairs, either exacerbating domestic conflicts, or provoking
was, moreover, a fallacy that the great European powers having patched together these territories, the Eurocentric concept of sovereignty would be accepted by Africans without challenge.

The combination of economic decline and increasing poverty, the ravages of the absence of institutions and modalities of governance during the Cold War, the colonial legacy that left a vacuum of political leadership and institutional government, corruption among oligarchies led by dynastic neo-imperial nationalists, and a measure of ambivalence among the former European colonial powers were catalysts for decades of civil war that destroyed human life, infrastructure, economic institutions, and the most rudimentary institutions of state, government, and governance. The arbitrarily drawn borders of African states, combined with the vast largely rural territories to be governed made near impossible the building of institutions of governance that afforded the sovereign people meaningful participatory democracy and a collective sense of investment in sovereignty of their states.

In much of Africa therefore, sovereignty became an abstraction. In his seminal work, Robert Jackson (1990: 52, 69) notes that 'One cannot speak convincingly of an African system of states on the analogy of, for example, the modern European states-system, or the city states-systems of ancient Mesopotamia and classical Greece ... African states were fluid and ad hoc creations that did not require a fixed human or territorial base'. Thus, the notion that the decolonized African territories were states because they, at least in theory, fulfilled the empirical standard that applied to European states, was at best erroneous. There has remained intact, if an abstraction. Two notable departures from the norm are noteworthy; one appears in the scholarship rather than in United Nations discourse, and the other appears outside the realm of the United Nations but postulated by a senior official thereof. In his seminal work, Robert Jackson (1990: 52, 69) notes that there was a duality in the legal standard of sovereignty that necessarily made it culturally biased: on one hand it was empirical; on the other hand it sought to apply a unique European phenomenon to the African colonies where there was no relevance. The latter dimension is particularly germane. Quoting Bozeman (1976: 131-133) Jackson (1990: 69) notes that 'One cannot speak convincingly of an African system of states on the analogy of, for example, the modern European states-system, or the city states-systems of ancient Mesopotamia and classical Greece ... African states were fluid and ad hoc creations that did not require a fixed human or territorial base'. Thus, the notion that the decolonized African territories were states because they, at least in theory, fulfilled the empirical standard that applied to European states, was at best erroneous. There
minority of states. Thus, the Republic of China on Taiwan may be classified by the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions as a province of the People’s Republic of China, but it enjoys sovereignty because a number of states recognize it as such. Conversely, the Palestinian territories do not enjoy de facto sovereignty because they are not recognized as an independent state. Iraq continued to be a state despite being invaded and occupied by the United States because the international community generally recognizes the sovereignty of that country. On the other hand, Kurdistan in Northern Iraq is not claiming sovereignty despite having its own currency, because its leadership perceives that it will not be recognized by the international community. Sovereignty is, therefore, conditional and to some degree arbitrary, rather than an objective reality based on an empirical or legal standard being met.

The vacuum of political and economic leadership at decolonization led to an absence of development policies and strategies that fostered economic, social and political stability in much of the former colonial world. This has been especially the case in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political dynasties relied on grace and favor and a culture of intimidation to survive, while corruption was vital to ensuring political longevity. Accountability and transparency never took root in many African countries negating the Western liberal democratic norms of nation-building and sovereignty. Many quickly collapsed into civil war, chaos, or anarchy with warlords fighting each other for control over territory, people and access to resources to finance their military campaigns. Ill trained and undisciplined paramilitaries systematized human rights violations manifest in crimes against humanity and even genocide. Ultimately, sovereign statehood made the civilian terribly unsafe in his or her country of citizenship, and served the narrow political and economic interests of those who hold extreme political power.

Rwanda represented a crucial turning point in the debate about human security. The state fell apart in 1994 as one subset within the dominant ethnic group of Hutu implemented its plan to exterminate the population of the minority Tutsi. To achieve its objective, the Interhamwe determined that it would systematically murder politically moderate Hutu as well as any Hutu who offered protection or comfort to Tutsi. The broader picture saw a civil war in which the Rwanda Patriotic Front, comprising Tutsi primarily, sought to overthrow the Hutu dominated Government. The result was the Rwanda genocide that lasted 100 days in which approximately 800,000 Tutsi, 75 percent of the population of Tutsi, were slaughtered by the radical Interhamwe. The
United Nations Security Council, far from strengthening its monitoring force in Rwanda, instead reduced the monitoring and peacekeeping force by roughly 90 percent in the early days of the genocide, while the Permanent Members of the Security Council refused to term the event genocide (Ghosts of Rwanda). Rwanda brought to the forefront the consequences of inaction by the United Nations and the self-appointed Permanent Members of the Security Council in particular. In graphic and dramatic form, Rwanda epitomized human insecurity – the utter vulnerability of a minority population to the application of the apparatus of the state with impunity, and with the clear intent to destroy in whole a population on the basis of ethnicity. The seeming paralysis with which the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly responded (or did not respond) was indicative of the combination of the power of adherence to the irrelevance of sovereignty, and a manifest absence of political will to strengthen and empower the monitoring force in Rwanda. Moreover, often lost in the discourse on the Rwanda genocide is the cataloguing of atrocities by agents of the government of Rwanda against civilians by B.W. Ndiaye, United Nations Special Rapporteur in April 1993, a year before the genocide (Ndiaye 1993).

Today, the United Nations is faced with a similar state of affairs in Sudan. Although there is a force of 26,000 peacekeeping personnel, it is of dubious effect because of the complexities of the application the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference, the challenge of political will and the veto in the Security Council, and protecting civilians who are being targeted by the central political authority and its state and non-state agents. The challenge remains how to undertake the transition in policy and operational terms from collective security to human insecurity to human security.

**Human Security**

The Commission on Human Security (2003) sought to lay the foundation for future action in defence of the vulnerable, in defining and outlining the parameters for the emerging concept of the security of the person. The Commission defined the traditional concept of sovereignty as the ability of the state to counter external threats, shaped in part by the Cold War, but noted that the challenge of sovereignty was also the challenge of threats to international peace and security, in that a threat within a state is also a threat to international peace and security. The Commission noted that Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations was premised on the conventional definition of sovereignty. Human security, the
Commission contended, was not a challenge to state sovereignty and security; human security ‘complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities and, further, to empower them to act on their own behalf’ (Commission on Human Security 2003: 2). Thus, human security complemented state security and sovereignty in four respects: a) human security was concerned with the security of the person and community rather than the state; b) threats to the security of the person include conditions that are not always regarded as threats to the security of the state such as pandemics; c) there is a wide range of actors beyond the state including non-state actors including non-governmental organizations and others representing civil society; and d) protecting and empowering individuals and communities to be self-reliant, especially in rebuilding after crises (Commission on Human Security 2003: 4).

The Commission noted a dual concept of security that is a function of culture, history and geography. Security to the industrial world is a function of inter-state conflict, whereas it is a function of the colonial intrusion and compounded by the cold war in the developing world. The persistent marginalization of Africa in the international system has served merely to exacerbate this dispensation. Thus the imperative of human security is concerned with violent conflict including genocide and terrorism, and deprivation of people including poverty, pollution, ill-health, illiteracy and so on (Commission on Human Security 2003: 6-10).

At the core of human security, therefore, was the notion that the security of the individual and community is imperative for peace to be realized and, in turn, for the development process to take root. The Commission defined human security as follows:

To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms— freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity (Commission on Human Security 2003: 4).

In quoting Kofi Annan, the Commission expanded the scope of its definition of human security to include ‘human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own
individual and community is the central prerequisite to state development.

The notion that development can occur in an authoritarian state in which the rights and liberties of the sovereign people can be defined and restricted by a powerful centre is self-defeating. Development requires popular participation, criticism of the functioning of the central authority, empowerment of the people to seek solutions to their challenges, and the redefining of the role of the central authority as a set of institutions that enable development by facilitating the needs and demands of the people. Without this reciprocal arrangement in which the central authority is responsive to the people and asserts authority and sovereignty on behalf of the people, any vision of development becomes futile as the centre becomes non-responsive, self-satisfying, corrupt, and autocratic. Thus, as the Commission on Human Security asserts, ‘It is no longer viable for any state to assert unrestricted national sovereignty while acting in its own interests, especially where others are affected by its actions’ (Commission on Human Security 2003: 12).

Evans (2008: 32-43) notes that, even in recent times, there have been substantial contributions to the discourse about sovereignty, all of which have offered variations on the same theme – sovereignty of the individual. From Kouchner’s notion of the right to intervene, to Deng’s sovereignty as responsibility of the state to its citizenry, to Annan’s postulate that sovereignty lies in the individual who has a right to be protected by the state and those who purport to represent the sovereign people. By extension, national self-determination as espoused during the wars of national liberation was predicated on the will of the people to be independent and to form a sovereign state of their own. By extension, sovereignty of the

**Peace and Development**

Human security is not intrinsically important. It is imperative for peace to take root as a pre-condition to development. Without the security of the individual being guaranteed, there is little prospect of peace, and lofty objectives of development strategy do not take root. In short, development as process and goals requires that the security and safety of the individual and community be realized. Beyond this, for development to occur the concept of sovereignty must shift from the central authority and seat of power to the people. Peace and Development

Human security is not intrinsically important. It is imperative for peace to take root as a pre-condition to development. Without the security of the individual being guaranteed, there is little prospect of peace, and lofty objectives of development strategy do not take root. In short, development as process and goals requires that the security and safety of the individual and community be realized. Beyond this, for development to occur the concept of sovereignty must shift from the central authority and seat of power to the people. Evans (2008: 32-43) notes that, even in recent times, there have been substantial contributions to the discourse about sovereignty, all of which have offered variations on the same theme – sovereignty of the individual. From Kouchner’s notion of the right to intervene, to Deng’s sovereignty as responsibility of the state to its citizenry, to Annan’s postulate that sovereignty lies in the individual who has a right to be protected by the state and those who purport to represent the sovereign people. By extension, national self-determination as espoused during the wars of national liberation was predicated on the will of the people to be independent and to form a sovereign state of their own. By extension, sovereignty of the
Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community. But history teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own people and avoid harming its neighbours. And in those circumstances, the principles of collective security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community, acting in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to help build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary protection, as the case may be (High Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change 2004: 17).

Thus, reciprocity between the central authority and people includes respect for the human rights of the population, political, economic and social inclusion, accountability and transparency, and carefully recognizing the responsibilities of the institutions of power and authority to the sovereign people. When the state fails to live up to its obligations and responsibilities to its people, the international community is obligated to intervene in support of the vulnerable, and based on the Charter of the United Na-

tions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as instruments conveying legal authority.

Security of the individual and community, therefore, is a prerequisite to the attainment of peace and the rigorous pursuit of development as process and objectives. The evidence lies not only in the experiences of developing countries today; one can refer to the positive impact on the economy and society of France when Henry IV promulgated the Edict de Nantes in April 1598 that decreed that Catholicism was no longer the official religion of France, that protestants were entitled to the same freedoms and liberties as Catholics (Encyclopedia Britannica. This lent confidence to the economy and cottage industries took off. On the other hand, revocation of the Edict by Louis XIV in 1685 had the principal effect of restoring persecution of protestants and other non-Catholics resulting in an exodus from France to the new colonies. The European experience is instructive in cultural and economic terms.

Beyond this, human security lays the foundation for a new international architecture in which the international community and the state have dual if not complementary responsibilities to the individual. An inability or unwillingness of the state to protect the individual and community from gross violations of human rights may trigger a responsibility that the international community has to protect; however, this is the ultimate fall-back position from a responsibility to prevent catastrophe. The failure of development strategy and the prevalence of autocratic regimes that systematically vio-
-late human rights on the basis of ethnicity including religion, gender, poverty, sexual orientation and other such identity markers has led the membership of the United Nations to the conclusion that two vital instruments are imperative to achieve development processes and goals: a responsibility to prevent disaster by emphasizing human security, and a responsibility to protect should that fail. Diametrically opposed is the reality of failure, anarchy, chaos, environmental degradation, genocide, crimes against humanity, poverty, malnutrition, resource wars, and so on.

Conclusions

The notion of sovereignty and collective security has been transformed during the life of the United Nations. It has especially taken on new meaning in the period since the end of the Cold War. The notion that the sovereign state is the central authority that cannot be challenged by its own people or by the international community has been revolutionized by human security and the responsibility to protect.

Moreover, there is increasingly recognition that development cannot occur where there is authoritarian rule and where the state is able to exercise arbitrary power against its own people, including the use of crimes against humanity and genocide. The Machiavellian construct of the state and its power in the exercise of sovereignty is no longer deemed acceptable, nor is it regarded as consistent with the pursuit of development as process and achievement of development goals. Increasingly therefore, the international community is holding states to a standard by which sovereignty is a function of external recognition contingent on the guarantee of basic human rights to the on the guarantee of basic human rights to the citizenry, including material benefits, access to education and health care, and institutions of governance that protect the people from excesses of government and afford the people representation in decision-making that affects their daily lives.

Human security is, at the same time, a natural prerequisite to the responsibility to protect. At the outset the state has a responsibility to protect its population in material terms. It has a duty to guarantee the people protection from the excesses of the state in as much as the potential for attack by a hostile state or non-state actor(s). However, the state as a central authority has a dual responsibility to its people and the international community, and failure to protect the population or any significant part thereof from crimes against humanity, including genocide, is indeed cause for intervention by the international community in defense of the defenseless.
References:


Wrong, Michela 2001 In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo, (New York: HarperCollins).
China’s New Diplomacy Since the Mid-1990s
Rationale, Reactions, and Significance

Zhiqun Zhu

Abstract

In a matter of a decade since the mid-1990s, China’s role in international affairs has been changed from being a bystander to an active rule-maker. What is the rationale behind China’s new diplomacy? How does the international community react to China’s new diplomacy? What are the implications for international political economy? This paper attempts to answer these questions by 1) examining the causes and considerations for the paradigm shift in China’s diplomacy, 2) analyzing the mixed responses from the international community especially China’s neighbors and the United States, and 3) discussing challenges for China itself and for global development in general.

Biography

Dr. Zhiqun Zhu received a Ph.D. in political science from the University of South Carolina. He has taught at Hamilton College in New York, University of South Carolina, and Shanghai International Studies University. In the early 1990s, he worked as the chief information assistant to the Consul for Press and Cultural Affairs at the American Consulate General in Shanghai. Professor Zhu is the author of US-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace (Routledge, 2006). He has published several book chapters on Asian political economy and US-China relations. His research articles have appeared on Asian Perspective, Global Economic Review, Journal of International and Area Studies, Journal of Asia-Pacific Affairs, Journal of Chinese Political Science, etc. Dr. Zhu was named a POSCO Fellow by the East-West Center in Hawaii in 2006. He is frequently sought by the news media to comment on US-East Asian relations and Chinese politics.
Confucius, giant pandas, and pirates in Somali, what do they have in common? They are all related to China’s new diplomacy. To expand its soft power, China has established over 300 Confucius Institutes globally by early 2009; to demonstrate its peaceful and friendly intentions, China has resorted to smile diplomacy, panda diplomacy, good neighbor diplomacy and other public relations offensives; and China has taken more global responsibilities such as hosting the Six-Party Talks and sending naval warships to fight piracy off the Somali coast. In a matter of a decade, China’s role in international affairs has been changed from being a bystander to an active rule-maker.

What is the rationale behind China’s new diplomacy? How does the international community react to China’s new diplomacy? What are the implications for international political economy?

China’s foreign policy has undergone several major transformations since the end of the Cold War. Immediately following the Tiananmen Square incident, as major Western powers imposed sanctions on China, the PRC leadership endeavored to develop China’s relations with its immediate neighbors. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, nicknamed the “godfather of contemporary Chinese diplomacy”, masterminded these efforts. The “good neighbor diplomacy” (mulin waijiao) worked. As a result, relations between China and the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) greatly improved and disputes over the Spratly Islands were temporarily shelved, making way for further economic and political cooperation. In 1990 Japan became the first great power that decided to lift economic sanctions against China. The Republic of Korea normalized and established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1992 and severed formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

By the mid-1990s, as Chinese economic power continued to expand and China became more confident, talks of revitalizing the Chinese nation were prevalent inside China. Increasingly the Chinese government and the Chinese public began to consider China as one of the great powers in the world. Built upon its successful “good neighbor diplomacy”, China refocused on the big powers in its foreign relations. Chinese leaders started to travel to major capitals and invited their foreign counterparts to Beijing. Most notably, this “great power diplomacy” (daguo waijiao) resulted in President Jiang Zemin and President Bill Clinton’s exchange of visits in 1997 and 1998. As a symbol of China’s growing importance in the global economy, China was eventually admitted into the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the beginning of the new century, after some 13 years of tough negotiations with the United States.¹
Since the mid-1990s China has been seeking oil and other energy and natural resources in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia, the South Pacific, and South East Asia. This new “energy diplomacy” (nengyuan waijiao) has become a key component of Chinese foreign policy in the new century. China desires a world order that is peaceful and conducive to its continued economic growth and stability at home. China’s trade and investment continue to grow and reach every corner of the world. By the end of 2008, China’s foreign exchange reserve had reached over $2 trillion.

A striking feature of China’s new diplomacy is that it has become more nuanced, sophisticated and flexible. The scale and scope of the new diplomacy notwithstanding, China is still learning to be a global power and to reconcile its own interests with those of the international community. While enjoying widespread support in the developing world, China’s diplomacy has also been met with concerns, suspicions, and criticisms, most notably from the United States and several other Western democracies.

Paradigm shift

The primary rationale of China’s new diplomacy is economic, rather than ideological or political. China’s investment, trade and other economic activities abroad, together with its efforts to expand cultural and social exchanges and to enhance its soft power globally, are an integral part of its strategy to present China as a peaceful, friendly, and constructive great power in the international political economy of the 21st century.

China’s diplomacy is experiencing a paradigm shift now. Major changes in China’s new diplomacy include:

- From being “passive” to being “active”
- From “bringing in” (yin jin lai) to “going out” (zou chu qu)
- From exercising “hard power” to expanding “soft power”

The doctrine of “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development”

In international affairs China has become more active, as evidenced by its role in the Six-Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear programs and its policies as part of the international efforts to deal with Sudan, Iran and piracy on high seas. Before the mid-1990s, China’s predominant political, economic, and diplomatic strategies had been to bring foreign investment and technology into China to help China’s growth. Since the mid-1990s China has been reaching out for energy and to enhance China’s soft power. China deeply cares about its international image, and wants to be perceived as a peaceful and responsible great power. The concept of “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development” has become a fundamental guiding principle of China’s new diplomacy.

Though realism and liberalism may partially explain what China has been doing in international political economy since
the early 1990s, social constructivism seems to offer a better theoretical framework to understand China’s policy shift and adjustment. Identities and concepts like “responsible stakeholder” and “peaceful rise” are relatively new for China. If “anarchy is what a state makes of it”, then new ideas such as “a harmonious society”, “peaceful rise” and “responsible stakeholder” can also be created and practiced by states. China is clearly learning to become a new player in the increasingly interdependent world.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the primary motivation for Chinese foreign policy is economic and much of China’s growing power comes from its economy, which is entering a new “going out” phase. After years of functioning as a foreign investment-driven export platform, China is moving up the “value chain.” Its companies are searching for new markets and technologies and are using the foreign currency earned from trade to purchase foreign assets. As a latecomer to the global oil game, China has focused on oil-bearing regions neglected by Western countries because of political turmoil, insecurity, and economic sanctions and embargoes. Many of the resources it is acquiring are in Third World countries, where instability and bad governance have kept Western multinationals away.

China is sometimes accused by Western countries of ignoring human rights abuses in countries like Sudan. China considers itself a socialist developing country that is not interested in lecturing others as Western powers have been doing. But because of its size and growing importance in international political economy, China is often held to a higher standard. China faces a dilemma about how to reconcile its own national interests and the interests of the international community especially Western powers.

Its companies are searching for new markets and technologies and are using the foreign currency earned from trade to purchase foreign assets. As a latecomer to the global oil game, China has focused on oil-bearing regions neglected by Western countries because of political turmoil, insecurity, and economic sanctions and embargoes.

As a rising global power, China’s every move is scrutinized by the international community, especially the United States. Though China does not seem to want to challenge US supremacy, concerns are growing about how China is going to use its power. To assuage such concerns, China has worked very hard to project its “soft power” and enhance its peaceful image around the world.
Good-bye to the traditional “non-interference” policy?

The Chinese government and Chinese public have become more confident now as China is playing an increasingly important role in global and regional affairs. According to a 1995 poll by the Horizon Group, a New York-based human resources management and consulting firm, when Chinese citizens were asked their views on “the most prominent countries in the world,” one third ranked the United States most prominent, and only 13 percent chose China. In 2003, the Horizon Group polled Chinese citizens again, and this time, nearly 40 percent picked China as “the most prominent country in the world”. In the past, “Whenever the issue of peacekeeping came up, China would either not participate or abstain,” says veteran diplomat Wu Jianmin, who served as a junior diplomat at the United Nations in the early 1970s, because peacekeeping did not fit China’s idea of nations minding their own business. Now, Wu notes, China has some 8,000 peacekeeping troops overseas. The message seems to be that it’s now acceptable to interfere in other countries’ affairs, as long as there’s a United Nations mandate. “We are a part of the existing international system,” explains Wu, who later served as China’s ambassador to France and President of the China Foreign Affairs University, “We are its beneficiaries. The international system is evolving and we are participating in it and constructing it.”

Indeed, China is gradually becoming more responsive to international demands to put diplomatic pressure on authoritarian regimes such as Sudan, North Korea and Myanmar. China’s special envoy on Sudan’s Darfur refugee issue, Liu Guijin, responded to foreign criticism that Beijing is shielding the Khartoum regime from censure by saying that “China’s basic policies on the Darfur question are not substantially different from those of Western nations. We agree that the international community should speak with one voice and exert equal influence on the Sudanese government and rebel forces ... or, as Western nations prefer to say, exert pressure.” China has sent engineers and peace-keeping forces to Sudan as part of the UN operations. At the end of 2007, China was involved in 7 peace-keeping operations in Africa. It had more peacekeepers in African than any other
Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has been playing a much bigger role in international affairs. From North Korea to Iran, from Sudan to Zimbabwe, China is aligning its policy with that of other major powers. “There is a trend … of China making decisions that reflect the international perspective more than the narrow Chinese perspective,” says David Zweig, a professor of Chinese international relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He points to the way Beijing has worked closely with Western countries over Darfur since 2007. “China is learning on this,” Professor Zweig adds. “They want to be a responsible player” in world affairs.

Until the mid-1990s, China had shunned multilateralism in foreign policy for fear of becoming a target of attack by a united West. Gone are those days. In 2006 alone, China hosted several major international conferences, attracting over 60 heads of state or heads of government. In June, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit was held in Shanghai. In October, China hosted the China-ASEAN summit. In November, the summit of the China-Africa Forum was held in Beijing. And in December China hosted a multilateral energy conference. Through a combination of growing economic clout and increasingly sophisticated diplomacy, China has established solid and productive relationships throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Central Asia and other parts of the world.

China has come to realize that growing hard power must be accompanied by soft power. If other countries mistrust its intentions, more power will lead to less security. China’s progress in building soft power is visible in the growing numbers of young people around the world studying the Chinese language. In many media reports, China is portrayed as an economic success story for its rapid development and achievements in pulling millions of people out of poverty.

International responses

Developing countries generally welcome China’s more active role in international political economy. They like China’s trade and investment. China’s successful economic reforms offer a useful example and development model for these countries. China is broadening the menu of choices for these developing nations as they attempt to achieve the long-delayed economic and social development.

According to Obiageli Ezekwesili, the World Bank’s vice president of the African region, Africa needs investments of some $22 billion annually to improve its infrastructure networks alone if it is to have global competitiveness. In addition, some $17 billion is required to maintain existing infrastructure. China has intensified its support to Africa’s economic
development since the beginning of the 21st century. It has renewed its commitment to give more financial and technical assistance to the continent, help it train professionals, reduce tariffs on products imported from Africa and cancel debts. China’s experience in lifting millions of people out of abject poverty and its development model are appealing to many developing countries. “The fundamental lesson of China’s transformation for Africa is embracing of reforms and integration into the market as a response to internal problems by finding solutions that enable citizens to take advantage of facilities that globalization offers,” commented Ezekwesili.9 Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia are eager to expand trade with China, despite some domestic concerns that imported Chinese products are crowding out local businesses.

Compared with many developing countries, some Western countries especially the United States have a more mixed response to China’s new diplomacy. China and the United States have converging interests in certain aspects, such as promoting peace in the Middle East, combating poverty in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and fighting piracy on high seas. For example, the United States supported China’s naval mission to the Gulf of Aden near Somalia in December 2008 as part of the global efforts to eliminate piracy in the area.

The two countries’ interests also diverge. China’s “no political conditions attached” trade and investment policy is at odds with America’s efforts to advance human rights and good governance in the developing world. By having good relations with authoritarian governments at the expense of human rights and good governance, China is perceived to be supporting those regimes, which greatly harms China’s international image and runs counter to its pledged role to be a responsible player in international political economy.

Anxiety is discernable among some American policy makers regarding China’s expanding diplomatic role around the world. Despite its repeated assurance of a “peaceful rise” policy, Beijing’s long-term motivations are less clear. Some analysts fear the United States is losing influence in the developing world. In July 2008, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman told the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “China’s full-court press to establish influence and connections in Africa and Latin America may be seismic in its future implications for the United States.”10

Some analysts are even talking about an “axis of oil” that links China with Russia,
Iran, Sudan and Venezuela. These authoritarian regimes could pose the most serious threat to the United States and its democratic allies since the collapse of the Soviet empire, according to Joshua Kurzantzick, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment. Others such as Randall Schriver, a former US deputy assistant secretary of state, are less pessimistic and argue that the growing Chinese reliance on the outside world for energy could actually drive China and the United States toward closer cooperation, since both powers want to keep shipping lanes open and encourage stability in oil producing regions.11

Whether the so-called “Beijing Consensus” challenges the “Washington Consensus” remains debatable, overall, China’s new diplomacy has been successful. China has promoted friendly relations with most of the countries around the world. Many developing countries regard China as a successful model for their own economic and social progress.

In Africa and Latin America, China’s trade and investment have promoted local development. An increasing number of countries hold a more favorable view of China than the United States. In the Middle East, China enjoys good relations with both Israel and the Arab nations and is playing a constructive role in the Middle East peace process. In Southeast Asia, many believe that China is filling the vacuum left over by the United States after the Cold War. Even with US allies such as South Korea and Australia, China has made headway towards presenting a very positive image through its sophisticated diplomacy.

A few other countries are following China’s footprints in strengthening relations with the developing world. India is copying many of China’s practices in terms of seeking economic resources and diplomatic support to ensure that it is not left too behind by China. In April 2008, India hosted its first India-Africa summit in New Delhi, which was attended by leaders from Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Algeria, Senegal, South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Two documents, the Delhi Declaration and the Africa-India Framework for Cooperation, came out of the first India-Africa summit. The Delhi Declaration was a political document to cover issues of bilateral, regional and international interest to India and Africa, including positions on the reforms of the United Nations, climate change, WTO and international terrorism. The Framework for Cooperation focused the areas of multi-cooperation on human resources, institutional capacity building, education, science and technology, agricultural productivity, food security, and the development of the health sector and infrastructure. Indian companies have made robust investments in Africa in
recent years, and India’s trade with Africa has increased from US$5.5 billion in 2001-02 to over $30 billion in 2007-08, said Shri Anand Sharma, Minister of State for External Affairs of India.12

China’s active diplomacy also compels other powers to strengthen their ties with the developing world lest they are out-competed and forced to accept a secondary role in the ongoing developments of that region’s political economy. The Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) convened in Yokohama from the 28th to 30th of May 2008, marking the fifteenth anniversary of the TICAD process, which was first launched by Japan in 1993. This summit-level conference brought together representatives from 51 African countries, 74 international and regional organizations, the private sector, civil society organizations, notable individuals, as well as 34 partner countries, including the G8 and Asian countries. In the opening session, then Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda delivered a keynote address in which he stressed Japan’s resolve to work together with African countries and the international community towards a “vibrant Africa.” He announced Japan’s intention to double its ODA to Africa by 2012. According to Fukuda, Japan will offer up to US$4 billion of ODA loans to assist Africa in infrastructure developments, and Japan will double its grant and technical cooperation for Africa over the next five years. He also pledged to extend financial support of US$2.5 billion, including the establishment of the Japan Bank International Cooperation Facility for African Investment, and other measures to encourage private Japanese investment in Africa.13

Implications for international political economy

China’s new diplomacy has significant implications for international political economy and raises several challenging questions for China itself. For example, will China be at loggerheads with the United States as the two economies compete for resources in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere? If these regions lack natural resources, will China still be interested in them? Can China’s development model be copied by other developing countries? How can China achieve a balance between defending its own national interests and becoming a more responsible and more respectable global power?

Development of alternative energy resources

According to some scholars, China’s economic security depends on three “Es”, namely, economic growth, energy security, and environmental protection. The three variables are dynamically linked with one another. With rapid economic growth, China’s energy security has become increasingly salient in ensuring sustainable development. Energy security means security of supply—sustainability of access to global energy resources—and security of demand—efficiency of energy consumption and environmental protection.14

About 80 percent of China’s power is still
generated by coal, the dirtiest source of energy. China already has eight or nine of
the world’s 10 most polluted cities. China, India and other emerging markets
are in the midst of exceptional economic booms and need cheap energy to keep
growing and modernizing. The environmental consequences of surging energy
use by these economies cannot be underestimated. William Chandler, an energy
expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, estimates that if the
Chinese were using energy like Americans, global energy use would double
overnight and five more Saudi Arabias would be needed just to meet oil demand.
India isn’t far behind. By 2030, the two countries will import as much oil as the
United States and Japan do today. Other emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia,
South Africa, and Indonesia also have greater needs for energy and export mar-
kets.
High oil prices and environmental deterioration have become driving forces be-
hind the development of alternative energies. China began tapping into renewable
energy in the late 1980s amid worries that pollution and related health and environ-
mental issues caused by rapid industrialization could cause social unrest. China
has strengthened research and development of alternative and renewable ener-
gies. In the long run, nuclear power will become one of China’s main energy
sources. China currently has nine operable reactors and two under construction,
with a further 19 having been proposed. The Daya Bay nuclear power plant and
Qinshan are big nuclear power plants already in operation. By 2010, nuclear
power, geothermal power, and biomass will have risen from 5 percent in 1990 to
10 percent of China’s power resources.

China has proposed a new concept of “green GDP”, with emphasis on protect-
ing the environment while promoting GDP growth. In 2007 China spent $10 bil-
lion—about 7% of the world’s total investment in green energy, making China
the 2nd largest investor in renewable energy. By 2020 China aims to have 15% of
total energy consumption in renewable sources, requiring a further $398 billion in investment.

Renewable energies such as wind, solar, and biofuels are expected to grow into a
$100 billion market over the next 15 years in China, making it a global powerhouse
in renewables. “China is rapidly moving into a world leadership position in the
industry,” observed William Wallace, an adviser to the United Nations Develop-
ment Program in Beijing.

China remains largely agrarian. One obvious strategy is making biofuels and bio-
gas out of the vast amount of agricultural and animal wastes, which can be used as a
substitute for imported oil. China is

“green GDP”, with emphasis on protecting the environment while promoting GDP growth. In 2007 China spent $10 bil-
lion—about 7% of the world’s total investment in green energy, making China the 2nd largest investor in renewable energy.
In fact, the downplaying of its capabilities has become a part of China’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, China needs to do a better job in explaining to the West and its neighbors, for example, why China (legitimately) needs to increase its military budget, what China’s intentions are as its power continues to grow, and how China and other powers can cooperate to promote peace and development around the world.

Establishing Confucius Institutes is just one way of promoting its soft power. Aiming to set up some 500 Confucius Institutes by 2020, China is careful to point out that these cultural centers aren’t pushing any ideological agenda. “Confucius Institutes do not teach Confucianism (as a religion). They don’t promote any particular values,” says Zhao Guocheng, an Education Ministry official in charge of the institutes. “They’re just an introduction to Chinese culture, and they’re established at the invitation of foreign people who want to understand China.”

A Confucian rule says, “Don’t do unto others what you wouldn’t wish upon yourself.” Confucius’ message on soft power was clear: Lead by moral authority, not force. Keep your own house in order, and others will follow your example. China must follow this golden rule in its new diplomacy.

The biggest challenge for China in the years ahead is perhaps its handling of Taiwan and Tibet. Any mishandling will immediately harm China’s international image.
Taiwan and Tibet

These two Ts will continue to be a heavy burden for China for a long time to come. It is perhaps understandable why China pushed hard to squeeze Taiwan’s international space when Taipei’s pro-independence government under Chen Shui-bian constantly provoked China, but people in Taiwan and elsewhere may ask: why are you so ruthless? At least some of China’s diplomatic success might be nullified by its tough handling of Taiwan. The “check book” diplomacy through which Taiwan and the PRC buy over diplomatic allies are not only wasting huge diplomatic resources but are harmful to cross-Taiwan Strait relations.

To placate the Taiwanese public, the majority of whom still prefer the “no independence and no unification” status quo, the PRC government has to change its strategy. Instead of denying Taipei’s international space, Beijing should confidently encourage and help Taiwan to continue to play some role in international economic and cultural affairs. Even in some international organizations that are strictly for sovereign states such as the World Health Organization, where the health conditions of the Taiwanese public are not reported, China must be flexible and creative so as to allow Taiwan’s interests to be represented. It makes sense for Taiwan to be included in these non-political forums since the condition of the 23 million people there is not just a political issue. Though Beijing considers “cross-strait” relations a domestic affair, how Beijing treats Taipei is closely monitored by other countries. Fundamentally, if China cannot resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully, then China’s claim to be a peaceful power will not be validated.

After Taiwan’s power transition in May 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou and the ruling KMT have been working to improve cross-strait relations, abandoning the pro-independence policies practiced by the Democratic Progressive Party in the previous eight years. To reciprocate, the PRC has also demonstrated goodwill towards Taiwan. At the end of 2008, the so-called “three direct links” across the Taiwan Strait—shipping, flight, and mail—became reality. Chinese President Hu Jintao expressed his government’s wish for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international community, with priority for Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization. On New Year’s Eve of 2009, President Hu proposed in a major policy speech that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should engage in efforts to promote military confidence building and discuss Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. Despite noticeable improvements in cross-strait relations, the final resolution of the Taiwan issue remains remote.
While the Taiwan situation has somewhat improved, the Tibet issue is likely to emerge as a more serious challenge to the PRC in the years ahead. Tibetan protests against Chinese rule in March and April 2008, especially disruptions of the Olympic torch relay in London, Paris, and San Francisco by pro-Tibet activities, highlighted China’s dilemma in Tibet.

The Dalai Lama enjoys widespread popularity around the world. He has repeatedly said that he does not seek independence, only genuine autonomy, for Tibet, but the Chinese governments is skeptical of his sincerity and considers him the source of violence and instability in Tibet. China is also suspicious of the Dalai Lama’s intentions of establishing an autonomous “large Tibetan area” within China. That large Tibet region would cover a quarter of China’s territory and is completely unacceptable to China.

The Dalai Lama and his supporters have accused China of carrying out “cultural genocide” in Tibet, while the Chinese government and many Chinese feel that the Dalai Lama ignores Tibet’s economic and social progress and that the Chinese government’s efforts to help Tibet develop by pumping in billions of yuan every year go unappreciated.

Despite the fact that Tibetan economy has been growing with massive financial support from the central government, China is being accused of having a poor human rights record in Tibet. Due to China and the West’s different interpretations of human rights and different perceptions of the current status of Tibet, China faces an uphill battle in defending its Tibet policy.

Concluding remarks

Probably few events in the 21st century international political economy will be as significant as the re-emergence and exercise of Chinese power. By the early years of the 21st century, China had fully integrated itself into the international economic and political system. China’s close cooperation with the developing world in trade, business, energy, and cultural exchanges is a potent and successful example of South-South cooperation.

However, China will be a half-baked “responsible stakeholder” if it cannot satisfactorily deal with “problem countries” such as Sudan, Zimbabwe, Iran, and North Korea. China’s relations with these countries will be scrutinized by the international community. In addition, China’s policies towards Taiwan and Tibet will also be closely monitored by other countries.

 Aware of the tragedies in history associated with global power transition, Chinese leaders seem determined to develop a peaceful path for China’s rise. The fourth generation of the PRC leaders, under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, developed the theory of “three harmonies (san hé)” – hexie shehui (a harmonious society), hexie shijie (a harmonious world), and heping fazhan (peaceful development), the theory that guided China’s domestic and international policies. China has attempted to project a peaceful image in the world, despite .
China’s New Diplomacy Since the Mid’1990s

concerns about its increasing military budget. From the 1997 Asian financial crisis to the North Korea nuclear issue and to the 2008-9 global economic downturn, China has behaved responsibly.

China’s new diplomacy is a reflection of China’s national interests. With continued growth of its economy, China is expected to widen and deepen its global search for energy and other resources and to expand its political clout. Meanwhile, China also strives to develop peacefully. It is actively promoting “soft power” by promoting cultural, educational and societal exchanges. Though its new diplomacy has become more sophisticated, China is still learning to be a responsible and respectable great power. One hopes that China’s new diplomacy will continue to benefit not only China but the rest of the world in the 21st century.
References:


5. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


22. According to a survey by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) in December 2008, 91.8% Taiwanese surveyed prefer the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, broadly defined. It is the highest support for maintaining the status quo since Taiwan began to conduct surveys on cross-strait ties in the 1980s. See “Most People Welcome China Links, But Suspect China: Poll,” Radio Taiwan International, December 26, 2008.
On Shame, Rage, and the Middle Eastern Conflict

Richard L. Rubenstein

Abstract

In his article “On Shame, Rage and the Middle Eastern Conflict,” Richard Rubenstein examines the genesis of the feelings of humiliation and defeat that led Adolf Hitler and his supporters to an unwarranted blaming of Jews for Germany’s defeat in World War I. This transference of blame culminated in the rise of Nazism and the Holocaust. Dr. Rubenstein uses this as a context to provide insights into the emergence of Arab animosity towards Israel and the United States following the 1948 Israeli War of Independence and the Six Day War of 1967.

Although much has been written about the role of economics in international affairs, little has been written about the role of shame and rage in the relations between nations. This is unfortunate because of the role these related emotions have played in the wars of the twentieth century and could play in the twenty-first century.

Rage itself has been characterized as a “shame-based expression of anger.” To experience shame, a person must compare his actions with some standard, either his own or another’s, and must regard himself as having failed to meet that standard. Shame is thus the product of the very self that it condemns. Rage has also been understood as “anger out of control.” Frequently, this kind of anger is related to “a perceived loss of control over factors affecting our integrity—our beliefs and how we feel about ourselves.” Put differently, rage is a response to the subject’s perception of his/her own impotence.

Guilt is different. Like shame, it involves recognition of the fact that I have violated a standard, but, unlike shame, guilt focuses on those undesirable actions I seek to end and for which I would make amends. By contrast, shame is not about specific actions but about myself. In shame I judge myself to be without worth. Put differently, shame is a painful, narcissistic injury in which corrective action is paralyzed and I am left only with an anguish of self-contempt.

Biography

Dr. Richard L. Rubenstein is President Emeritus of the University of Bridgeport. A Distinguished Professor of Religion at the University and a Life Member of the Board of Trustees, Dr. Rubenstein also serves as Director of the University’s Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies. An internationally recognized historian of religion whose writings lie at the root of Holocaust writings, his works have been the subject of more than a dozen doctoral dissertations. One of his books entitled "The Cunning of History" was recently translated into French. Professor Rubenstein’s writings have also been cited as a key inspiration for the Academy Award winning film Sophie's Choice. Prior to assuming his role as President of the University of Bridgeport, Dr. Rubenstein served as Distinguished Professor of Religion at Florida State University. Recently Florida State University created the Richard L. Rubenstein Chair for Religious Studies in his honor.
For example, in the past, Muslim anti-Jewish hostility could be characterized as the condescension or contempt of a dominant power toward a useful but powerless inferior. Today, Muslim, especially Arab, anti-Jewish hostility partakes of something entirely novel in the history of Islam, the rage of those who have experienced defeat in the face of an enemy's military victories and economic success. The situation was difficult enough when Christendom reversed centuries of Muslim dominance; Jewish military victory in 1948, characterized by the Arabs as al-Naqba (the catastrophe) was far less tolerable. Even Hezbullah's ability to hold its own against Israel during the 2006 war in Lebanon has not really dissipated that rage among a critical mass of Muslims.

Bernard Lewis took note of this phenomenon almost two decades ago in an Atlantic Monthly article, “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West and why their bitterness will not be easily mollified.” Long a knowledgeable observer of the world of Islam, the Princeton historian took note of the fact that the rejection of the West by an important segment of the Muslim world had generated emotions that could only be characterized as rage. Indeed, this rejection was becoming so unconditional that Muslim extremists could think of no more fitting characterization of the West than “enemies of God.”

According to Lewis, in its heyday the Muslim world saw itself as “the center of culture and enlightenment, surrounded by infidel barbarians whom it would in due course civilize.” As Lewis has commented, the struggle between Islam and Christendom has consisted in “a long series of attacks and counterattacks, jihads and crusades, conquests and reconquests” that have lasted for fourteen hundred years. It was not until the failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 that the world of Islam found itself on the defensive vis-à-vis the world of Christendom.

Particularly humiliating was the fact that Christian empires came to dominate much of the world of Islam. This was equally true of the expansion of the Tsarist Empire in the East and the Western European powers in the Middle East, Africa, India, and Indonesia. In the nineteenth century, Britain, France, Spain, Italy, and Holland divided up much of the Muslim world almost at will. The nineteenth-century efforts of the European powers to secure equal rights for Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire were especially galling. The world of Islam had been built upon an hierarchical system of structured inequality in which the religious and social dominance of Muslims over unbelievers was the uncontested first premise. Built into the very structure of Muslim identity was the system of dhimmitude, namely, “the comprehensive legal system established by the Muslim conquerors to rule the native non-Muslim populations subdued by jihad wars.” No matter how brilliant, talented, or wealthy an unbeliever might be, the humblest believing Muslim was regarded as superior to all unbelievers, at least in the eyes of Allah.

In the nineteenth and much of the twen-
On Shame, Rage, and the Middle Eastern Conflict

In the twentieth century, Westerners tended to regard their influence on Islam as essentially beneficial. The French, for example, spoke of their colonial expansion as a *une mission civilatrice*. By contrast, traditional Muslims regarded western influence as disorienting. To take but one example, confronted with the movement toward gender equality in the West, traditional Muslim societies have tended to react harshly. Thus, the program of gender control under the auspices of the Taliban Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (*al-Amr bi al-Ma'ruf wa al-Nahi `an al-Munkir*) was one of the most draconian in modern times. Moreover, the Taliban Ministry was itself modeled after a similarly named Saudi agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran has its own version of religious police (*Arabic, mutaween*). One of the worst examples of *mutaween* abuse occurred in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on March 11, 2002 when members of the Saudi religious police prevented school girls from leaving their burning school building because they were not wearing headscarves and black robes and were not escorted by a male guardian. Fifteen girls died and fifty were injured in the incident.

Other examples of gender control include so-called “honor-killings.” In April 2001, a representative of Human Rights Watch took note of this phenomenon before the UN Commission on Human Rights:

Honor crimes are acts of violence, usually murder, committed by male family members against female family members who are perceived to have brought dishonor upon the family. A woman can be targeted by her family for a variety of reasons including, refusing to enter into an arranged marriage, being the victim of a sexual assault, seeking a divorce -- even from an abusive husband -- or committing adultery. The mere perception that a woman has acted in a manner to bring "dishonor" to the family is sufficient to trigger an attack. The ramifications of this impunity for women are significant. For example, a woman in an abusive marriage must make the choice to stay in the marriage and hope that the violence will end, or leave the marriage and hope that neither her husband nor any male relatives will kill her. A women who is raped, even if she can prove that she was a victim of sexual violence, may be killed by her husband, father, son, brother or cousin.

Honor killings can thus be seen as an attempt to erase the stigma of shame from a family by eliminating the offending member. No act of contrition will do. Only the death of the alleged offender will suffice. Some of the alleged “offenses” seem trivial by Western standards.
for example, Adolf Hitler had for years drifted without any definite vocation. The war gave Hitler his calling by giving him a “chance to defend his beloved Motherland.”

In the early nineteen-twenties, Hitler described his feelings when Germany declared war on Russia and France in August 1914:

To me these hours seemed like a release from the painful feelings of my youth. Even today I am not ashamed to say that, overpowered by stormy enthusiasm, I fell down on my knees and thanked Heaven from an overflowing heart for granting me the good fortune of being permitted to live at this time.

For Hitler, the stakes could not have been higher:

Destiny had begun its course... this time not the fate of Serbia or Austria was involved, but whether the German nation was to be or not to be.

Imperial Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914 and on France two days later. On August 5, 1914, Hitler volunteered for service and served with the Second Reserve Battalion of the Second Bavarian Infantry, known as the List Regiment, for the duration of the war. The unit first saw combat on October 29, 1914. After four days of fighting, the regiment was reduced in number from 3,600 to 611. The depressingly high casualty rate did not dampen Hitler’s enthusiasm for the war. He identified with Germany’s

According to the Daily Telegraph (UK), a young Saudi woman was murdered by her father for chatting on Facebook, a social network web site. She was beaten and shot after her father found her in the middle of an internet conversation with a man. In a particularly bizarre case, a 16 year old Jordanian woman was murdered by her brother because another brother had raped her. The victim, not the rapist, was seen as having brought shame upon the family. While such killings are not officially sanctioned and are not confined to Islam, the official penalties incurred for such crimes tend to be exceptionally light when and if applied.

At the heart of all such behavior there appears to be masculine fear of loss of control, with all that such loss entails for personal identity. We need not enter into psychoanalytic reflection about masculine fear of the feminine to explain the need for control over women found in strongly patriarchal cultures. When unable to control their women, some men in traditional societies are likely to experience feelings of impotence and rage. Unfortunately, impotent rage can be sated, if only temporarily, by injury and murder. All too often men deny their impotence by their power to kill.

German Defeat in World War I

In important respects, Lewis’s characterization of Muslim rage is not unlike what many right-wing, German nationalists experienced in the face of Germany’s defeat in the First World War. Before the war,
struggle in a deeply personal way. He found his element in his regiment and in the war itself. He was apparently content to serve as a dispatch runner for the duration. According to Ian Kershaw, one of Hitler’s most authoritative biographers, “from all indications, Hitler was a committed, rather than simply conscientious and dutiful, soldier, and did not lack physical courage.” Wounded slightly by shrapnel in October 1916, he was hospitalized in Berlin until December 1, 1916. He returned to his regiment on March 5, 1917. On August 4, 1918, he received the Iron Cross, First Class, a rare achievement for a corporal.

On the night of October 13, 1918, Hitler was painfully wounded in a British gas attack. By the next morning he was blind and was shipped to a hospital in Pasewalk near Stettin. It was there that he learned “the shattering news of defeat and revolution,” what he called “the greatest villainy of the century.”

Hitler described his reaction upon learning of the way the war ended:

I could stand it no longer. It became impossible for me to sit still one minute more. Again everything went black before my eyes. I tottered and groped my way back to the dormitory, threw myself on my bunk, and dug my head into my blanket and pillow. I had not wept since the day when I had stood at my mother’s grave…. The more I tried to achieve clarity on the monstrous event in this hour, the more the shame of indigna-

-Germany’s defeat was his personal defeat. For him the war would never end. He described his reaction when he first learned of the defeat:

And so it had all been in vain. In vain all the sacrifices and privations; in vain the hunger and thirst of months that were often endless; in vain the hours in which, with mortal fear clutching our hearts, we nevertheless did our duty; and in vain the death of two million who died.

Unable to bear the shame of military defeat, Hitler concluded that Germany had not been defeated but betrayed:

I knew that all was lost. Only fools, liars, and criminals could hope in the mercy of the enemy. In these nights hatred grew in me, hatred for those responsible for this deed.

According to Hitler, Jews and Marxists,
the so-called “November criminals,” were responsible for Germany’s ultimate disgrace, surrender. Since Hitler had no intention of accepting the “Versailles Diktat” as the permanent basis for Germany’s relations with its enemies, another war was inevitable were he ever to gain power. And, in such a war, there would be no place for Jews once again to “betray” Germany.

Hitler’s response to Germany’s defeat in November 1918 was a private matter, but the official response of the German high command was not very different. On March 3, 1918, Bolshevik Russia signed a peace treaty with Imperial Germany. Less than three weeks later, General Erich Ludendorff launched the first of four German offensives against the Allies. With Russia defeated and the full force of American arms yet to be felt, the German public had every confidence that they would win the war. By July 1918 the German offensive had spent itself. On September 29, 1918, Ludendorff summoned Germany’s political leaders and demanded that they ask for an immediate armistice. In seeking an armistice, Ludendorff and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, the Chief of the General Staff, were partly driven by fear of the imminent collapse of German arms and its likely consequences, the worst being a Russian-type revolution in Germany. Nevertheless, with the German army still in northern France, Belgium, and the former Tsarist Empire, a number of senior officers strongly opposed the armistice initiative. Their resolve was strengthened after receiving Woodrow Wilson’s uncompromising replies to the German armistice request between October 10 and 14. Ludendorff and Hindenburg became convinced that the Allies would never offer peace terms Germany would deem acceptable.

According to historian Michael Geyer, the High Command became convinced that surrender was incompatible with German honor which could only be saved by an apocalyptic Endkampf (terminal struggle) involving the systematic devastation of the population and infrastructure of occupied French and Belgian territory, as well as a possible war to the death involving the entire German population. The Endkampf would be both a war of annihilation against the enemy and the self-annihilation of the German nation. Geyer reports a conversation between Ludendorff and General Ernst von Ei- enhart-Rothe in which the latter brought up the issue of what would be done if the Allied terms for an Armistice were deemed “insufferable:”

Then, will Excellency [Ludendorff] not hope with me that a furor teutonicus will break out in the entire land, like August 1914 had seen, which will give us the ability to fight on, albeit unto annihilation. His [Ludendorff’s] eyes started to gleam and he responded with a strong and secure voice: “I count on it and hope for sure.”

German defeat did not result in an Endkampf because the government of the newly installed Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, and the Reichstag majority rejected the High Command’s plans.
rejected the High Command’s plans. Prince Max pointed out that the first responsibility of the government was to assure the survival of the nation. If that meant acknowledging defeat, the humiliation had to be accepted. Prince Max’s thinking was consistent with that of Germany’s greatest military philosopher, Karl Clausewitz (1780-1831), who saw war as an instrument of politics. By contrast, the High Command insisted that the Allied terms were dishonorable. Hence, total military catastrophe was to be preferred to a humiliating surrender.

In late October, Hindenburg and Ludendorff attempted to persuade the Kaiser to reject the armistice and call for a Volkskrieg, a total “people’s war.” The Kaiser refused and sent them with several other senior commanders, to meet with the Imperial Vice Chancellor Friedrich von Payer, Prince Max being unavailable because of illness. Ludendorff sought to persuade Payer to abandon peace negotiations and call for a popular insurrection. The issue for both the military and the German ultra-right was no longer victory or even territorial defense but the “honor” involved in preferring catastrophic national destruction to surrender.

Payer rejected Ludendorff’s demand for an end to peace negotiations whereupon Ludendorff declared, “Then, your Excellency, I throw the entire shame of the Fatherland into your and your colleague’s aces (emphasis added).” In his memoir of the war years, Payer spelled out his fundamental disagreement with Ludendorff:

An army commander with his en-

tourage may well end his illustrious career [Ruhmeslaufbahn] with a ride into death [Todesritt], but a people of seventy million cannot make the decision about life and death according to the terms of honor of a single estate [i.e., the military].

Geyer recounts that Rear Admiral Magnus von Levetzow, Chief of Staff of the Naval High Command, was also present at the meeting. In his memoirs, Levetzow described Ludendorff as “a majestic man, a representative of German honor” and described Payer as “a small, crappy party hack without a sense of national dignity and honor …weighing everything only from a petit bourgeois point of view …sitting there cowering, with his beady, hate-filled eyes and clasped hands, under the powerful blows of the general.”

Geyer comments on this encounter, “One could call this [the encounter between Ludendorff and Payer] the pivotal scene in the formation of the stab-in-the-back legend.” Although Payer was not Jewish, von Levetzow used classical anti-Semitic stereotypes to characterize him. According to historian Peter Pulzer, “In the eyes of the extreme Right Payer had long counted as an honorary Jew.”

Neither Hitler nor the World War I German High Command invented the tradition of the ignoble betrayer who in stealth and treachery brings defeat upon the German military. It was deeply embedded in their cultural world. Although more Jews proportionally than their fellow citizens made the supreme sacrifice for what they
On Shame, Rage, and the Middle Eastern Conflict

mistakenly thought was their Fatherland, that sacrifice was invisible to the German High Command, and, increasingly, the German public. On the contrary, in October 1916, the German High Command ordered a *Judenzählung*, “a Jew census,” to demonstrate that Jews were less patriotic than what at the time were considered their “fellow Germans.” The findings demonstrated the opposite to be true. Approximately eighty percent of the Jews in the German army served in the front-lines. Over 100,000 Jews served out of a total German Jewish population of 550,000; 12,000 died in battle; 30,000 were decorated for bravery. Disappointed, German military officials suppressed the findings.

To repeat, a person who experiences guilt can make reparation for *specific* acts whereas a person who experiences shame cannot. In shame, reparation seems impossible as the *whole person* is self-condemned as worthless. Hence, the temptation to evade self-condemnation by projecting one’s shame onto another is almost irresistible. Instead of punishing oneself, one punishes another for one’s failings.

This was especially true of Imperial Germany, a society in which the warrior caste stood at the very apex of the social hierarchy and military prowess was the emblem of superlative masculine virtue. By failing to achieve victory and by impotently standing by while Imperial Germany’s civilian authorities consented to what amounted to *unconditional surrender*, leaving the nation at the mercy of its enemies, the German warrior caste had failed its ultimate test. Nothing could be more shameful than to have been vanquished in a war in which approximately two million of their comrades were killed and 4,814,557 reported wounded. 39

### In shame, reparation seems impossible

The findings demonstrated the opposite to be true. Approximately eighty percent of the Jews in the German army served in the front-lines. Over 100,000 Jews served out of a total German Jewish population of 550,000; 12,000 died in battle; 30,000 were decorated for bravery. Disappointed, German military officials suppressed the findings.

To repeat, a person who experiences guilt can make reparation for *specific* acts whereas a person who experiences shame cannot. In shame, reparation seems impossible as the *whole person* is self-condemned as worthless. Hence, the temptation to evade self-condemnation by projecting one’s shame onto another is almost irresistible. Instead of punishing oneself, one punishes another for one’s failings.

This was especially true of Imperial Germany, a society in which the warrior caste stood at the very apex of the social hierarchy and military prowess was the emblem of superlative masculine virtue. By failing to achieve victory and by impotently standing by while Imperial Germany’s civilian authorities consented to what amounted to *unconditional surrender*, leaving the nation at the mercy of its enemies, the German warrior caste had failed its ultimate test. Nothing could be more shameful than to have been vanquished in a war in which approximately two million of their comrades were killed and 4,814,557 reported wounded. 39

### The Stab-In-the-Back Legend/Prelude to Genocide

As the war came to a close, Germany’s military leaders prepared to reject responsibility for their catastrophic failure. It seemed inconceivable to them that Europe’s most advanced industrial power, with the best universities and scientific personnel, could collapse and surrender while the German army, numbering in the millions, still occupied the soil of its enemies. Moreover, the greatest humiliation was arguably yet to come. Article 231, the “war guilt clause” of the Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, stipulated that:

….Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies. 40

During the nineteen-twenties, the Treaty
of Versailles, especially Article 231, was viewed by the majority of Germans as a “dictate of shame” whose purpose was to keep Germany from regaining the status of a great European power. The compulsory signing was especially bitter because Germans of all political persuasion “had rushed to arms in 1914 in the sincere conviction that they were fighting a war of self-defense.”

At the time, Munich was home to Adolf Hitler and the embryonic National Socialist party. As noted, advocates of peace negotiations came to be characterized as either “Jewish” or influenced by “a Jewish mentality.” By 1919 Ludendorff was committed to the “destruction of the internationalist, pacifist, defeatists,” namely, the Jews and the Vatican, people who “systematically destroyed” our “racial inheritance and national character.” Not surprisingly, Ludendorff took part with Hitler in the Munich Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. A year later, the general wrote that Germany must be made judenrein, “free of Jews,” before the next war. The stab-in-the-back legend thus became a prelude to genocide. If, as the legend asserted, the Jews had succeeded in bringing down the mighty German nation by treachery and stealth, it was imperative to eliminate them for Germany to achieve success in the coming war. Hitler saw the war’s outcome as did Ludendorff. He had no doubt that the cause of Germany’s defeat

The “stab-in-the-back” legend gained enhanced credibility in the German Right from the visible presence of left-wing Jews in the leadership of revolutionary movements that sought to end the war and establish socialist or communist regimes in its aftermath.
had not been the failure of German arms but betrayal by Jews and Marxists. He was resolved to enter politics to prevent a repetition of the alleged betrayal. Thus, the Jews of Europe were ultimately to pay with their lives for the monumental, and indeed cowardly, evasion of responsibility by Germany’s World War I military leadership in seeking to preserve their “honor.” To the bitter end, a rage-obsessed Hitler saw himself as the innocent victim of those who had conspired to bring him and Germany down.

Defeat and Muslim Rage

Like the rage of the German ultra-right, the rage of contemporary Muslim extremists and their fellow travelers against Jews, Zionism, America, and, ultimately, the entire Western world has its roots in military defeat. In the case of rage against the West, the roots can be found in the Battle of Lepanto (1571), the lifting of the Ottoman siege of Vienna by the Polish King Jan III Sobieski on September 12, 1683, and the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699). At Karlowitz, the Ottomans signed a peace treaty for the first time on terms “basically determined by their victorious enemies.” The treaty set the pattern of Muslim retreat and defeat that continued until the middle of the twentieth century.

As noted above, no defeat visited upon Muslims by unbelievers has ever been as deeply felt as an offense against Muslim honor as the twin defeats inflicted upon the Arabs in the 1948 Israeli War of Independence and the Six Day War of 1967. This has been cogently expressed by the Israeli historian Benny Morris in the concluding paragraphs of his book on the first Arab-Israeli War:

But 1948 has haunted and still haunts, the Arab world on the deepest level of collective identity, ego, and pride. The war was a humiliation from which that world has yet to recover—the antithesis of the glory days of Arab Islamic dominance....The 1948 War was the culminating affront, when a community of 650,000 Jews-Jews, no less-crushed Palestinian Arab society and then defeated the armies of the surrounding states. The Arab states had failed to “save” the Palestinians and failed to prevent Israel’s emergence and acceptance into the comity of nations. And what little Palestine territory the Arabs had managed to retain fell under Israeli sway two decades later.”

Since the 1930s there have been numerous attempts to “solve” the Arab-Israeli conflict. In recent years, there has been much talk about a “peace process.” Almost immediately after assuming office, President Obama let it be known that he
intended to pursue it energetically. Perhaps in anticipatory compliance, Israel’s outgoing prime minister, Ehud Olmert, gave an interview on September 21, 2008 to the Israeli daily newspaper Yedioth Achronoth outlining the territorial concessions he believed Israel must make for the sake of peace with its neighbors. Yet, no attempt to resolve the conflict has ever succeeded. This writer would like to suggest that such efforts have failed because all of the proposals for a “two-state solution,” with their implicit promise of Palestinian economic amelioration, do nothing to address the fact that Arabs see the presence of Jews on what they regard as their land as an affront to their honor and a source of abiding shame. It may be possible for Arabs to accept a hudna or truce of long duration but not a genuine peace.

Part of the appeal of Hamas is its claim that the Jewish presence in Israel/Palestine is illegitimate. The Covenant of Hamas, its fundamental document, asserts that “…the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf [an inalienable religious endowment] consecrated for future Muslim generations until Judgment Day.” (Article 11, Hamas Covenant) Hence, “there is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors. (emphasis added)” (Article 13)

Could anything be clearer? Yet, senior statesmen in the West and even in certain Israeli circles are under the illusion that either Hamas’s leaders do not mean what they say or they can be talked out of what they mean. Neither outcome is likely, not because the leaders of Hamas are terrorists, although they are obviously willing to use terror as part of their strategy, but because they are religiously committed to a reading of Islam that will brook no compromise on the subject of Palestine. This is a reality that secularized elites in the West and Israel either do not understand or do not want to understand.

If these reflections have any merit, the people of Israel are faced with the prospect of a future of unending conflict of varying degrees of intensity. This is the price they have had to pay when they exchanged the hazards of dependent minority status for the dangers of sovereignty. In reality, they had little choice. Hitler and, truth to tell, his very many European sympathizers had demonstrated what minority status could lead to under condi-
tions of modernity. While it is true that two Muslim countries, Egypt and Jordan, have signed “peace” treaties with Israel, a critical mass among educated professionals and the “Muslim street” in both countries remain completely unwilling to accept any “solution” to the conflict other than Israel’s disappearance, an outcome a nuclear-armed Israel is hardly likely to accept gracefully.
References:

1. Jim Platt, “Crossing the Line: Anger vs. Rage,” Working@Dartmouth,  
   http://74.125.95.104/search?q=cache:PviYnlwDmTAJ:www.dartmouth.edu/~hrs/pdfs/ager.pdf+22crossing+the+line:+anger+vs.+rage%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us  
   (emphasis added), accessed September 8, 2008.

2. For the analysis of shame and guilt, I am indebted to Michael Lewis, “The  
   Role of the Self in Shame,” Social Research, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Winter 2003),  
   pp. 1181-1189.

3. W. Walter Menninger, “Uncontained rage: A psychoanalytic perspective on  
   120.

4. Jim Platt,


   resent the West and why their bitterness will not be easily mollified,” The  
   Atlantic, September 1990.

8. Ibid.


10. Bat Ye’or, “Dhimmitude Past and  

11. A list of Taliban restrictions and mistreatment of women supplied by the  
    Afghan organization by the Revolutionary Associations of the Women of  
    Afghanistan can be found at http://www.rawa.org/rules.htm. On gender  
    discrimination by the Taliban, see Ahmad Raschid, Taliban: Militant Islam,  
    Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University  
    Press,2001), pp. 105-116; see also “Humanity Denied: Systematic Violations  
    of Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, October  

12. “Fifteen girls die as zealots ‘drive them into blaze.’” Daily Telegraph,  
    March 15, 2002,  
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/1387874/15-girls-die-as-zealots-%27drive-them-into-blaze%27.html ; see also “Saudi police  
    ‘stopped’ fire rescue,” BBC News,  


19. Ibid.


24. Mein Kampf, p. 204-206; Waite, The Psychopathic God, p. 244.


27. Schivelbusch, Culture of Defeat, p. 197.


30. Wilson stipulated that the Central Powers would be required “immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territories.” He further insisted on “absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees.”
for the maintenance “of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and its allies in the field.” And, Wilson explicitly demanded a new government in Germany because “the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy.” The text of Wilson’s replies are to be found in Oliver Marble Gale, *Americanism: Woodrow Wilson’s Speeches on the War* (Chicago: Baldwin Syndicate, 1918), pp. 141-144. This book was digitized and made available by Google from the Harvard University Library.


34. Friedrich Payer, *Von Bethmann Hollweg bis Ebert: Erinnerungen und Bilder* (Frankfurt am Main: Frankfurter Soziätats-Druckerei, 1923), pp. 142-43; I am indebted to Geyer, *loc. cit.* for this citation.

35. Deist, *loc. cit.*


42. On the Niebelungen tradition, Siegfried and Hagen, see Geyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 506, 517-520; for a discussion of the role of Judas in transforming the Jews into the perennial betrayer of the


46. Erich Ludendorff, *Kriegführung und...*
Book Review on: **Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West**
(Harper Collins, 2008) Benazir Bhutto

Thomas J. Ward

Benazir Bhutto’s assassination on December 27, 2007 abbreviated the life of a major Muslim leader who was committed to the furtherance of democracy and convinced of its compatibility with Islam. The author’s *Reconciliation* aspires for a democratic future for Pakistan and for the furtherance of democracy throughout the Muslim world. In the concluding chapter of her book, she outlines a process that she recommend that both Islam and the major democratic powers pursue in order to address and reverse the advances that have been made by radical militants in the Muslim world. *Reconciliation*, completed on the morning of the day of the former Prime Minister’s assassination, addresses four major issues: Islam and its tenets vis-à-vis democracy and human rights; historical highs and lows in the West’s relations with the Islamic world; political developments in Pakistan, from the Mughal Empire through the rule of General Pervez Musharraf including the defining meeting with Musharraf in Abu Dhabi in July 2008 that opened the way for her return to her homeland. In the final chapter, the author challenges Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” and especially his view that a clash between Islam and democracy is virtually inevitable.

A graduate of Harvard, the first woman ever to lead Pakistan attributes the rise of radical Islam to a combination of developments. For examples, she argues that the second putsch leading to her ouster as Prime Minister took place on November 4, 1996. This date happened to coincide with a presidential election day in the United States. Her overthrow, she argues, opened the way to a déroulement of events, including the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan and the entrenchment of radical Islamic elements in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The author laments the lack of Western reaction to the coup against her in 1996 and she points to the legacy of the West’s support or tacit acceptance of dictatorships in South Asia and in the Middle East because such arrangements served to the political and economic advantage of the West.

The author especially criticizes the United States for its handling of Afghanistan, arguing that many of the victorious Afghan
mujahedeen and their countrymen were profoundly appreciative of the substantive military support provided by the United States. Many had embraced a more inclusive, pluralistic future for Afghanistan. However, even those holding such views found themselves abandoned by the United States, once the American interest in crippling the Soviet Union had been achieved. This insidious dumping of Afghanistan made it possible for the Taliban and other radical elements in Afghanistan, including Al Qaeda, to decry the United States as a self-serving power, committed to the destruction of communism and yet dismissive of the need for the rebuilding of Afghanistan. The United States’ policies led to a grateful, promising ally morphing into America’s principal enemy in the span of just one decade.

Ms. Bhutto maintains that the Muslim world’s problems stem, to a significant extent, from the colonial period under Europe as well as from the West’s attitude toward the developing world during the Cold War. The Cold War led to the nations of the Middle East and South Asia being viewed as pieces in the West’s geopolitical chess game. There was an implicit acquiescence to most of the pawns, rooks, bishops, knights and even the queen of the geopolitical foray suffering devastation in the process of winning the Cold War. However, the author consistently argues that the current quagmires in the Islamic world cannot merely be attributed to the West’s comportment. She argues that, for too long, Muslim authoritarian regimes have rationalized and shielded repression through searching the scriptures of the Quran and the Hadith not as an exercise in faith but as a tool to institutionalize their authoritarian control of economic assets and political structures. Bhutto maintains that, ultimately, it is the Muslim world that must take responsibility for the failure of democracy in that part of the world.

In the late Prime Minister’s view, the West’s support for dictatorships in the Muslim world and the concomitant corruption of such states represent the provocateurs of the current state of affairs in the Muslim world. Dictatorship needs to needs to be addressed and alleviated if the social and the political conditions of the Muslim world are to be transformed. This concern, the author makes clear, is what motivated her return to Pakistan. She laments in the opening pages of her text that her return to Pakistan led to the massive terrorist attacks on October 18, 2007. She points to the brutality of the attack against her on the day of her return, pointing out that the dual explosion that impeded her motorcade’s entry into Karachi was instigated because an infant dressed in the colors of her beloved Pakistan Peoples Party had explosives strapped under his clothing. Those explosives and the child were detonated as Madam Bhutto’s motorcade made its way through that
Book Review on “Reconciliation”

Born of a Sunni father sired from a key founding family of Pakistan and from a Shi’ite mother of Iranian origin, Benazir Bhutto recollects in Reconciliation that her father, the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928-1971), who, like her, shares the Urdu honorific “Shaheed” or “Martyr,” never tolerated the unequal treatment of women and applied the same standards in the raising of his daughters as he did for his sons.

It was her father’s care and his denial of “ceilings” for women that served as one impetus for Ms. Bhutto to pursue a leadership role in her country, which resulted in her serving twice as Prime Minister of Pakistan and three times as leader of the Opposition.

Reconciliation vigorously challenges the unfair stereotyping of Islam as anti-woman. The author criticizes unfair treatment of women in Muslim countries and denies that such behavior stems from the Quran or the Hadith. She points out that the Quran calls not just for the modest behavior of Muslim women but for the same type of behavior for Muslim men. While expressing no opposition to the bhurka, Bhutto does not attribute its usage to edicts of the Prophet Mohammed but to regional customs. She notes that the first edict of the Quran is to “read” and points out that the Prophet’s own daughter Fatima was taught to read and that the Prophet’s wife was extensively involved in commercial activities and suffered no rebuke from Mohammed for such activity. The author attributes the draconian treatment of women in numerous Middle East states not to Islam but to longstanding local customs and practices that predate Islam.

While Reconciliation provides numerous insights and constructive strategies for addressing radical Islam and improving ties between Islam and the West, the author still does leave many questions unanswered and she does not clarify her own position on a number of matters. For example, she points out that in 1962 General Ayub Khan, who served as President of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969 attempted to change the name of the country from the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” to “Republic of Pakistan” in 1962. She observes that General Khan failed to heed warnings from his advisors that this could backfire and one is left with the impression that Ms. Bhutto feels that this effort by Ayub Khan was misguided although, on the other hand, she has high praise in her text for Ataturk, the Turkish leader who secularized Turkey during in his rule from 1923 to 1938.

Ms. Bhutto fails to elaborate on why removing the Islamic modifier in the official name of Pakistan was a miscalculation. One is left wondering whether this was due to her opposition to a secular Pakistan (she points out that, as in Arabic, the Urdu word for “secular” means atheist), or due to her belief that Islam can indeed accommodate pluralism, or due to a sense that this was not yet the moment for such reform.
Islam is not alone in establishing a tie-in between the State and religion. In the final two decades of the past century, a number of Latin American countries including Argentina, Paraguay and Colombia reformed their constitutional guidelines that had stipulated that the President of the Republic had to be a Roman Catholic. On the other hand, in numerous other countries such as Japan, Great Britain and Spain, the head of state remains associated with a particular religion, however, this does not imply that the activities of those states are guided by a sectarian viewpoint.

Bhutto’s chapter on the legacy of Western colonialism and its aftermath illustrates ways in which the colonial experience deprived billions of the needed underpinnings for a democratic future. Nevertheless, her treatment of this period history is superficial and demonstrates a selective memory. In some cases, Bhutto’s assertions are built upon wishful thinking, including her statements maintaining that Fidel Castro and Ho Chi Minh only embraced Marxism-Leninism after assuming power. She also apparently fails to accept the extent to which the United States was not an obstacle to Castro’s rise to power.

The greatest strengths of the Bhutto text are found in her chapter on the Clash of Civilizations. The Prime Minister demonstrates perspicacity in articulating the key problems facing the Moslem world. She outlines key strategies to address such problems. Prime Minister Bhutto’s text argues convincingly that the origins of terrorism do not reside in the Islamic faith.

She instead links its origins to the problems of poverty and underemployment that are so common in the most populous countries of the Islamic world including Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and Indonesia. She argues that Islamic radicals develop a rationale to defend their activities because of longstanding alliances between the United States and Muslim countries that remain in the hands of authoritarian leaders and military leaders. “Guilt by association” is used by such radicals to attribute the struggles in the Islamic world to the West and to the West’s efforts to prevent the emergence of enlightened Islamic leaders who can bring about genuine change in their societies.

The late Prime Minister argues that Islam can and should serve as a vehicle for genuine change in the Islamic world. Almsgiving, for instance, one of the five underpinnings of Islam, can serve as the religious rationale for the oil rich nations of the Middle East to help to improve the conditions of fellow Muslims in less prosperous states. The institutionalization of religiously mandated protocols of service
could foster greater generosity and public mindedness. Bhutto also outlines the role that the West needs to play in bringing about change in the Middle East. She speaks of the need for a new Marshall Plan for the Muslim world, similar to what led to the resurgence of Western Europe following the Second World War. She cites numerous examples of how foreign aid from the United States and other Western countries, including the assistance the United States provided to Muslims during the Tsunami in December 2004 and to victims of the Pakistan earthquake of 2005, directly contributed to changing the view the Muslims had of the West.

Harvard- and Oxford-educated, Benazir Bhutto had a profound grasp of things East and West. Like many leaders of her region, she had been implicated in financial scandals, justified or not. Nevertheless, this towering figure in Pakistan history had an intense and burning desire to bring democracy and peace to her country and she offered her life in an attempt to realize this goal. In the struggle for the future of Islam and South Asia, the voice of Benazir Bhutto was able to inspire many advocates for democracy. Her tragic passing leaves a vacuum, similar to the loss of Indira Gandhi with whom her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had succeeded in finding a pathway to peace for the two neighboring but rival countries.

Prime Minister Bhutto was a remarkable spokesperson for her faith, for her country and for democracy. I concur with those who find it fortuitous that this text could be completed prior to her passing. It invites readers to look at Islam again and it also serves as a measured antidote to actions such as the United States’ unwarranted aggression against Iraq in 2003. Hopefully, this final political testament of Benazir Bhutto can contribute to the realization of a road map for peace for South Asia and for the Middle East. One can only hope that her husband Asif Ali Zardari can further her vision for the Muslim world in his new role as President of Pakistan.
The University of Bridgeport’s International College is pleased to announce the creation of its Master of Arts in Global Development and Peace is a four semester graduate course of study that includes an overseas internship. This Master's degree is designed to prepare future civil servants and business professionals for careers in global development, human security and diplomacy and mediation.

Students in the Global Development and Peace program can focus on one of the three areas of study:

1) Political Economy and Development for students interested in working in less developed countries or in international development agencies and organizations.
2) Culture and Conflict Resolution for students interested in a career in government or a non-governmental organization.
3) Global Management for students with an interest in international business.

Students will be expected to demonstrate or to develop a working knowledge of one foreign language during the course of the program.

Students will spend a minimum of two months in an overseas internship. The program can be completed in two years.

For more info please see the Master's Program fact sheet.

Internship Opportunities

The Masters of Arts in Global Development and Peace includes a two month overseas internship for all domestic students. Non-US may do their internship if their first language is not English. Domestic students are expected to intern in a country where they can practice the foreign language that they have studied. Students will normally work with an international organization, a governmental agency or an international non-governmental organization.

Career Opportunities

International College graduates have gone on to work for the United Nations, for international agencies, for International Non-Governmental Organizations. Many have also gone on to work in the corporate world in venues such as General Electric, UBS Warburg, Goldman Sachs, BNY-Mellon, Pitney-Bowes. We anticipate students with the Masters of Arts in Global Development will integrate well into International organizations, development agencies and into corporations which have a significant overseas presence.